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ARTICLES
THE PRIVILEGE'S LAST STAND: THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE RIGHT
TO REBEL AGAINST THE STATE*
Michael S. Greent
'"I have no reason to suppose that he who would take away my
liberty would not when he had me in his power take away
everything else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one
who has put himselfinto a state ofwar against me and kill him if I
can.mt

"[T]rials by the adversarial contest must in time go the way of the
ancient trial by battle and blood.»2

• @1999 Michael S. Green. All Rights Reserved.
t Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law. B.A., University
of California, Berkeley; Ph.D. (Philosophy), Yale University; J.D., Yale Law School.
I would like to thank Hugo Bedau, Peter Berkowitz, David Bernstein, Kiersten
Boyce, Nelson Lund, Michael O'Neil, and Richard Posner for helpful comments on
this Article. Akhi1 Amar and Paul Kahn also provided advice concerning an early
draft of Part m. This Article was written with financial support from George
Mason University School of Law and its Law and Economics Center.
1
Handwritten quotation from John Locke's SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT
found in Timothy McVeigh's possession at the time he was arrested. David B.
Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of
Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 247, 287 n.147 (1996) (quoting
Nolan Clay, McVeigh Carried Political Writings When Arrested, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Nov. 4, 1995); see JOHN LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT, in POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE § 18 (David Wooton ed., 1993) (1689).
2
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, Address Before the American Bar
Association (Feb. 12, 1984), quoted in Jay Sterling Silver, Equality of Arms and
the Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional Right, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1007, 1022
(alteration in original).
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INTRODUCTION

A. Two Mysteries
Two mysteries surround the privilege against self-incrimination. The first is why it exists. Since Jeremy Bentham,3
legal academics have repeatedly argued that the privilege lacks
a coherent rationale.4 With the possible exception of the Second Amendment, with which it may be linked conceptually,5
the privilege is unique among provisions in the Bill of Rights
in having generated a predominately negative academic literature. This is not to say that it has not had some academic
defenders. But because they offer so many different justifications, each of which is vulnerable to significant objections, they
merely reinforce the idea that its purpose is a mystery. 6
In the first half of this Article I will argue that academic
defenses of the privilege have indeed failed. This lack of a

3

See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 207-83 (1827).
' See L. LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE PRiviLEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION? (1959); Akhil Reed Am.ar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 888-98 (1995);
David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?,
33 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1063 (1986); Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 711-18 (1988); Henry Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case
for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 679-95 (1968); John
McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation,
Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE Scr. 138, 142-51 (1960); Henry T. Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against
Forcing Self-Incrimination, 15 YALE L. REv. 127, 127-30 (1906); John H. Wigmore,
Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REv. 71, 87 (1891).
5
See infra Part IV.C.7.
6
See Dorsey Ellis, Vox Populi v. Suprema Lex: A Comment on the Testimonial
Privilege of the Fifth Amendment, 55 IOWA L. REv. 829, 837-39 (1970) (privilege
protects against cruelty); Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80
ETHICS 87, 91-94 (1970) (privilege protects privacy interest in revelations of guilt);
Thomas S. Schrock et al., Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 48-54 (1978) (privilege protects right of defendant to
make an autonomous judgment about his moral culpability); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REv.
311, 327-33 (1991) (privilege protects innocent but nervous defendant from conviction as a result of a poor performance on the stand); William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1988) (privilege excuses
defendant's unavoidable peijurious testimony).
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coherent justification for the privilege is more than a purely
philosophical or jurisprudential problem. Because the purpose
of the privilege is unclear, its scope cannot be reliably drawn.
The law on the privilege is an ad hoc muddle largely because
no one knows why it exists.7 If no other justification for the
privilege can be found, we should seriously entertain altering
or abolishing it.
The second mystery surrounding the privilege is why the
consensus of the academic literature is contrary to popular
perceptions of the privilege. Whatever academics might say,
most citizens, including most judges, find the privilege viscerally attractive. This dissonance has not been much discussed.
Its cause, I believe, is that popular support for the privilege is
based upon two intuitions that have been ignored in the academic literature, because they have been thought to be too
vague, circular, or resistant to analysis. I disagree. In the second half of the Article I will argue that these intuitions can be
understood as principled justifications for the privilege, both of
which tie the privilege to a criminal defendant's right to rebel
against the state.
But my goal in shedding light on these intuitions is to
provide the foundation for a persuasive argument against the
privilege. Since academic defenses of the privilege fail, these
two intuitions are very likely the final defenses the privilege
has. And since these intuitions are in fact principled justifications, they are vulnerable to principled criticism. Furthermore,
such criticism, unlike past academic attacks, has the potential
to influence popular supporters of the privilege. I end this
Article with an indication of what such an argument against
the privilege would look like.
One important caveat. Anyone who criticizes the privilege
runs the risk of appearing an advocate of squad-room torture.
But criticism of the privilege should not be equated with criticism of every protection accorded criminal defendants that has
been found to have its source in the privilege. In particular,
protections during custodial interrogation by the police that
have been derived from the prj.vilege, including a right of silence during such interrogation, might have an independent
7

See Stephen A Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 6-10 (1986).
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justification.8 It is the core protection of the privilege-the
right of the criminal defendant to refuse to take the stand
during trial-that I will suggest cannot, in the end, be successfully defended.9

B. Two Vague Intuitions
In a passage from Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor10 that is often cited in cases discussing the
underlying justifications for the privilege against self-incrimination, Justice Goldberg claimed that the privilege:
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to
leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load'; our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life'; our distrust of selfdeprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent.'11

Of the justifications mentioned by Justice Goldberg, the first
two-the "cruel trilemma" argument and the argument from
our accusatorial system of justice-are probably the most popular in judicial opinions and among lay-people.12 Yet they are

8

See infra Part II.C.
' Furthermore, abolishing a right of silence during trial does not necessarily
mean a defendant compelled to speak would be vulnerable to perjury sanctions.
The greatest benefit from the abolition of the privilege might result from the
prosecution's ability to take advantage of the defendant's lies on the stand to discredit him in front of the jury, making punishment for perjury unnecessary.
10
378 u.s. 52 (1964).
11
Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
12
See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1090-91 (cruelty argument is one of the oldest
and most persistent arguments in favor of the privilege); Stuntz, supra, note 6, at
1237 (cruel trilemma argument is the most popular argument for the privilege).
. Since Justice Goldberg first used the phrase in Murphy, the Supreme Court has
referred positively or neutrally to the "cruel trilemma" argument by name 13
times. See United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (1998); Bregan v. United
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also the two that are most commonly dismissed by legal academics, who tend to concentrate on arguments that the privilege fosters the truth-seeking functions of our judicial system13 or that it protects the defendant's right to privacy or his
right to make autonomous decisions concerning his culpability.
The "cruel trilemma" argument claims that it is cruel to
submit the defendant to the trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. Academic critics of the argument usually begin by noting that sanctions for perjury or contempt are not in
themselves cruel. They are, after all, something every subpoenaed witness faces. 14 If the trilemma is cruel, it must be because perjury and contempt sanctions coerce the defendant to
take the self-accusation horn of the trilemma. But why is that
cruel? Certainly it is not because punishment for wrongdoing is
cruel; otherwise the criminal justice system as a whole is undermined. But if punishment for wrongdoing is not cruel, how
can it be that compelling the truthful testimony leading to
such punishment is cruel?
Proponents of the cruel trilemma argument have a response, but it has generally been thought to be too vague to
provide a persuasive rationale for the privilege. The argument
usually offered is that compelling someone to act as an agent
of his own destruction is inhumane.15 To those who share this
States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 810 (1998); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596-97
(1990); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 669 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983); Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299 (1981); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476 &
n.8 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974); Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971);
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 566 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tehan
v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12 (1966).
For a discussion of the frequency with which the accusatorial justification of
the privilege appears in judicial opions, see JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS,
TRUTH AND THE LAW 46 & nn.99-101 (1993).
13
For example, the privilege might foster the truth-seeking functions by reducing the incidence of coerced-and so unreliable-confessions or by protecting
innocent defendants from performing poorly on the stand.
~' See GRANO, supra note 12, at 38; Vmcent Martin Bonventre, An Alternative
to the Constitutional Privilege Against Selflncrimination, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 31,
54-55 (1982).
15
See GRANO, supra note 12, at 39; Bonventre, supra note 14, at 55; Kent
Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv.
15, 46 (1981); David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger
Traynor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CAL. L. REV. 89, 95 (1965); David M. O'Brien,
The Fifth Amendment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits, and the Burger Court,
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intuition, it is visceral and self-evident. AB Justice Field put it:
"The essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to
expose his own guilt is obvious to every one, and needs no
illustration. It is plain to every person who gives the subject a
moment's thought. "16 One defender of the cruelty argument
has mysteriously argued: "[W]e cannot demonstrate why it is
'cruel.' We feel that it is cruel. Beyond that we cannot go."17
Another writer has called "almost metaphysical" the notion
"that encouraging a person to participate in his own 'downfall,' ... is inconsistent with the person's inherent dignity as a
human being, whether or not he is guilty."18
But it is precisely this resistance to analysis that has led
the cruel trilemma argument to be dismissed in the academic
literature.19 To those who do not share the intuition, it is baffling.20 For example, we often consider our family members,
friends, and neighbors to have a duty to respond to questions
grounded in reasonable (and sometimes unreasonable) suspicions, even though responding may be to their disadvantage.21

54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 26, 41-45 (1978).
16
Brown v. Walker 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting).
17
Ellis, supra note 6, at 838.
18
Geoge E. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern
Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 333 n.214.
19
See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1092-93. There is nothing wrong with
unanalyzable moral intuitions. Indeed, since moral justifications must end somewhere, some moral intuitions must be unanalyzable (or at least unanalyzed). Ellis
argues that the cruelty intuition in favor of the privilege is genuinely foundational.
See Ellis, supra note 6, at 851 (the privilege "is founded upon value concepts
which in logic are themselves basic premises, incapable of being derived from some
other 'given'"). But that is unlikely. Unanalyzable moral intuitions are usually
comprehensive in applicability and are widely accepted, such that arguments in
their favor do not have to be given and are not felt to be necessary. Consider, for
example, the intuition that, all other things being equal, harming an innocent
human being is worse than not harming him. The intuition in favor of the privilege addresses a much more concrete situation and is, as we have seen, something
concerning which rational disagreement is possible. Furthermore, it seems too tied
to broader issues about the relationship between the criminal defendant and the
state to be unanalyzable. The intuition is not that compelling self-incrimination is
cruel and humiliating in any context. It is the state's compelling self-incrimination
that is claimed to be inappropriate. Thus, it would appear to be analyzable in
terms of a citizen's broader duties to the state.
20
See Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 890; Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1093-95;
Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 318; Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1237-39.
21
See WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 59 (1967); Friendly,
supra note 4, at 680; Charles T. McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51
Nw. U. L. REV. 218, 222 (1956) ("Ordinary morality . . . sees nothing wrong in
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If we do not believe that a right to hide wrongdoing is necessary to prevent cruelty in the private realm, why should we
when establishing rules of criminal procedure?22
... The second justification, which looks to our preference for
ail adversarial or accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of justice, is usually dismissed as circular. Proponents
of this argument tend to equate an adversarial system with a
system that provides the privilege yet offer no argument why
the adversarial system is worthy of retention.23 In the end,
the argument for the privilege on the basis of our preference
for an adversarial system of justice amounts to nothing more
than an argument for the privilege on the basis of our preference for the privilege.
Because. the academic literature on the privilege has ignored these two justifications, it has failed to speak to the
asking a man, for adequate reason, about particular misdeeds of which he has
been suspected and charged.").
22
The trilemma argument has also been criticized because third-party witnesses can be put in no-win situations almost as discomforting as the trilemma, if not
more so. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 46-47; Dolinko, supra note 4, at
1093-95; Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1237-39. For example, an immunized witness can
be compelled to testify against those who might harm him or his loved ones in
retaliation. In addition, since civil sanctions can be as onerous as criminal penalties, the cruel trilemma argument would appear to justify a privilege in civil proceedings as well. Furthermore, the argument seems insensitive to the fact that the
no-win situation in which the criminal defendant finds himself is the product- of
his own culpable acts. See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1098-99. -The criminal defendant would not be in a position to choose between self-accusation, perjury, and
contempt had she not committed a crime.· The cruel trilemma seems no different
from the cruel dilemma of those convicted of crimes, who must either accept punishment or the dangers that attempting to escape punishment entails. We do not
feel that the dilemma is cruel, because it flows from the defendant's culpability.
Of course, a defendant might be innocent and yet have genuinely self-incriminating evidence. For example, someone might have committed the actus reus of a
crime without having the culpable mens rea. In such a case her cruel choice between self-accusation, perjury, and contempt would not flow from her own culpable
acts. But a justification of the privilege on the basis of its ability to protect innocent defendants from cruel trilemmas is vulnerable to the criticisms of instrumentalist justifications discussed below. See infra Part II. If juries are likely to draw
adverse inferences from silence, the best course of action for the innocent criminal
defendant is probably to reveal all the facts. In addition, such a justification cannot explain our feeling that the privilege ought to protect the guilty as well as the
innocent.
23
See GRANO, supra note 12, at 47-52; Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1067 n.24;
Ellis, supra note 6, at 839; Friendly, supra note 4, at 695; Greenawalt, supra note
15, at 46; Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Priuacy, 1967 SUP.
CT. REv. 193, 209.
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concerns of the majority of those who support the privilege. I
will argue that these justifications can be analyzed as principled arguments for the privilege, each of which is tied to the
idea that the defendant is engaged in legitimate battle with
the state. The "adversarial" nature of a criminal justice system
is tied to a social contractarian political theory, under which
the defendant owes the state no natural duty of allegience.24
Because his duties to the state have their source in his consent, he may, by challenging the state's authority, engage in
warfare with the state-a form of unmediated conflict in which
neither side has authority over the other and each may act
according to his own moral lights. The privilege is a means of
expressing this independence the defendant has from the state.
To those who adhere to this theory, inquisitorial systems of
justice, by imposing on the defendant a duty to participate in
the state's investigation of his activities, illegitimately "subordinate [the defendant] ... to the state."25 Given that the privilege is perceived to be the embodiment of principles that "go
to the nature of a free man and to his relationship to the
state,"26 it is not surprising that popular support for the privilege is tenacious.
Similarly, proponents of the cruel trilemma argument see
the state's compelling the defendant to bring about his own
destruction as cruel because they implicitly apply the morality
of warfare to criminal procedure. Consider the analogy between the defendant's right to silence and the right to silence
enjoyed by prisoners of war under international law, who need
give only their name, rank, and serial number,27 or the analogy between the defendant's alleged right not to participate in
his own downfall, and the principle, also expressed in international law, that prisoners of war cannot be compelled to directly aid their captors, for example, by working in munitions

24

See, e.g., Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum,
25 CLEV. BAR Ass'N J. 91, 98 (1954); Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege
and Documents: Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 468 (1984).
25
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 194 (1988).
2
' United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
27
See Convention (ill) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened
for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 17, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention].
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factories. 28 I will argue that these analogies are significant
and that American criminal procedure seeks to protect the
defendant against forms of cruelty and humiliation peculiar to
conditions of battle. Because our adversarial system of criminal
procedure treats the defendant and the state as legitimate
combatants, the duties owed to combatants apply in this context as well.
My argument is that the morality of warfare and social
contract theory coalesce in the popular, but vague, perception
that compelling self-incrimination is a cruel and humiliating
subordination of the defendant to the state. Of course, whether
I have accounted for popular intuitions in favor of the privilege
can be answered only by those who possess them. But this
account has resonated with a sufficient number of supporters
of the privilege (to whom I have presented it) that it is fair to
say that it does some justice to their ideas.
If I am right, future debate over the privilege will have to
tackle some unfamiliar issues in political theory and moral
psychology. For example, the justifiability of the privilege will
turn on whether we have merely contractual duties to the state
and on the tendencies of criminal defendants to think of themselves as challenging the state's authority. In addition, defenders of the privilege will have to show why principles of respectful combat are not simply too musty and antiquated to support
a rule of criminal procedure. I will argue that opponents of the
privilege are likely to win these debates.

C. Outline of the Argument
Part I of this Article provides a brief discussion of the
inability of historical accounts of the rise of the privilege to
shed any light on its purpose. In Parts II and III, I argue that
the cruel trilemma and adversarial arguments are the only
viable rationales for the privilege remaining. To this end, I
canvass and reject academic justifications for the privilege, as
well as a number that have not been discussed in the past.
Justifications of the privilege are generally instrumentalist
or rights based. That is, the privilege: (1) contributes to efficient enforcement of the law by aiding in the acquittal of the
21

See infra Part V.
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innocent (or, less likely, the conviction of the guilty) or (2)
protects a right or interest of the criminal defendant that overrides considerations of efficient law enforcement.
Part II examines why instrumentalist justifications of the
privilege fail. By focusing on protections that the privilege provides to innocent defendants, instrumentalist justifications fail
to capture the view that the privilege is also intended (or perhaps especially intended) to protect the guilty. The argument
that the privilege exists to protect the innocent suffers from
other problems, most notably the fact that juries tend to draw
adverse inferences from silence. That juries tend to draw such
inferences despite judges' admonitions casts doubt on the idea
that the privilege protects innocent defendants who might perform poorly on the stand. Part IT also introduces and rejects
the hitherto unexplored argument that the privilege protects
the innocent by allowing jurors to draw positive inferences
from their free choices to take the stand.
Part Ill examines and rejects traditional rights-based
justifications of the privilege, including the arguments that the
privilege exists to excuse unavoidable perjury; that it protects
against the enforcement of laws regulating personal belief; that
it protects the privacy of the criminal defendant; and that it
protects his integrity, autonomy or personal identity. Those
justifications appealing to the autonomy or the personal identity of the criminal defendant have the most promise and are
the most popular in academic defenses of the privilege. But
they draw upon previously unnoticed Kantian views of the self
that, although plausible on their own terms, cannot be squared
with common views about moral education and the state's
authority to punish. In the end the privilege looks justified
only because the state's authority as a whole looks unjustified.
One gains the privilege at the cost of being an anarchist.
Part IV explains the adversarial justification of the privilege in terms of contractarian theories of the state. In the
course of exploring whether social contract theory can justify
the privilege, I look at apparent arguments for the privilege
that can be found in Hobbes, Locke, and Nozick and argue that
they fail. I conclude that, although the privilege cannot, strictly
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speaking, be justified by social contract theory, it helps the
privilege take on important expressive significance by explaining how the defendant and the state can be seen as engaged in
unmediated conflict.
Finally, Part V outlines how the expressive function of the
privilege is supported by the cruelty argument, which applies
the morality of warfare to the interaction between the defendant and the state. I conclude the Article with a brief discussion of some of the issues that should be explored by both
opponents and advocates of the privilege and a suggestion that
the former are likely to prevail.
I. THE INABILITY OF THE HisTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE TO SHED
LIGHT ON ITS PuRPOSE

Although it is often the case that "a page of history is
worth a volume of logic,"29 the history of the privilege against
self-incrimination does little to illuminate the reasons for its
existence. The privilege is commonly thought to have its source
in seventeenth-century English resistance to the use of the ex
officio oath by the Star Chamber and High Commission. This
rise of the privilege appeared to be the triumph of the English
common law over Roman and canon law.30 Interestingly, the
resistance to the ex officio oath actually had its source in Roman and canon law itself. The maxim "Nemo tenetur prodere
seipsum" ("No person shall be compelled to accuse himself'),
which was offered as a defense to the oath, was itself a product
of the ius commune, a combination of medieval Roman and
canon law.31 Furthermore, this maxim did not refer to a right
to refuse to answer questions, but only to a right not to be
interrogated until someone stepped forward as an accuser (or
one's misdeeds were so well known that an accuser was unnecessary).32 In other words, the maxim performed the screening

2t New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.); see
also Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) (Frankfurter, J .) (applying

.
Holmes's maxim to the privilege).
30
See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 5, 20, 216-18, 325 (2d ed. 1986).
31
See R.H. Helmholz, The Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
The Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974 (1990).
32
See R.H. Helmholz, The Privilege and the Ius Commune: The Middle Ages to
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function currently performed by the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.33 The ex officio oath was in
conflict with the maxim, not because answers to questions
were compelled, but because they were compelled in the absence of well-grounded suspicion.
Nor can a right to remain silent be found elsewhere in
criminal procedure of English common law. Those common law
invocations of the privilege prior to the late eighteenth century
that did not concern the right not to be interrogated without
probable cause merely asserted a right not to have testimony
compelled, where testimony was understood to be compelled if
it resulted from torture or the use of an oath.34 Religious conviction at the time made the oath appear excessively coercive.
Indeed, under the common law rule disqualifying parties from
testifying under oath, the criminal defendant had no right to
testify under oath, even if he wanted to. 35 There is little evidence of the right of an unsworn defendant to remain silent in
the face of interrogation. Unsworn defendants were routinely questioned both in Great Britain and in its North
Atlantic colonies.36
Indeed, because there was generally no right to counsel in
colonial criminal procedure and because the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel did not take hold until the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, the privilege could have no real
purpose prior to that point.37 It would be a privilege to offer
no defense at all. It was only through the increased use of
defense counsel after the ratification of the Bill of Rights that
the privilege as we know it came into being. Rather than being
intended by the Founders, the privilege was a creation of defense counsel well after the ratification of the Fifth Amend-

the Seventh Century, in HELMHOLZ, ET AL., THE PRlVn..EGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 17 (1997).
33
See id. at 44; see also Albert W. Altschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical
Perspective, in HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 181, 185-89.
34
See Altschuler, supra note 33, at 181, 190-97; Eben Moglen, The Privilege in
British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, in llELMHOLZ
ET AL., supra note 32, at 109; John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The
Constitutionalization of American Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEx. L.
REV. 825, 834 (1999).
35
See Witt, supra note 34, at 834-35.
36
See Altschuler, supra note 33, at 181, 190-97; Moglen, supra note 34, at 109.
37
See Moglen, supra note 34, at 109.
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ment.38 Given its irrelevance to eighteenth-century criminal
procedure, it is not surprising that the privilege was included
in the Fifth Amendment with virtually no comment.39 Those
discussions of the privilege that did occur were limited to prohibition against torture.4° Furthermore, neither James Madison, who proposed the Fifth Amendment, nor George Mason,
who drafted its prototype in the Virginia Declaration of Rights,
provides us with any information concerning the purpose or
scope of the privilege.41 The same is true of the proponents of
early state constitutional provisions protecting against compelled self-incrimination.42
Because the history of the privilege does not shed light on
its purpose, justifications for the privilege are necessarily
ahistorical. We know so little about the Founders' attitudes
toward the privilege that no one seeks to justify it in terms of
purposes that were contemplated by the Founders.

38

See Moglen, supra note 34; Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the
Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1086 (1994) [hereinafter Moglen U. The analogous rise of the privilege in early
nineteenth century England is described in John H. Langbein, The Privilege and
Common Law Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in
HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 82, 82-100, and John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92
MICH. L. REv. 1047 (1994).
39
See United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2223 (1998) ("[T]here is no
helpful legislative history.''); id. at 2241 (Breyer, J., dissenting); LEVY, supra note
30, at 430; Moglen, supra note 34, at 136-38.
•o Consider Patrick Henry's remarks in favor of including the privilege in the
Fifth Amendment:
Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to
that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France,
Spain and Germany-of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime.
They will say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a
necessity of strengthing the arm of government, that they must have a
criminal equity, and extract confession by torture, in order to punish
with still more relentless severity.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447-48 (J. Elliot ed., 1836); see
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2631 (1996) (arguing that Framers understood the privilege solely to outlaw certain forms of torture).
1
•
See Moglen, supra note 34, at 133-36.
42
See Moglen, supra note 34, at 133-36; Witt, supra note 34, at 832-33.
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INSTRUMENTALIST JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE PRIVILEGE AND
THEIR WEAKNESSES

Instrumentalist justifications of the privilege appeal to its
role in the discovery of the truth, either because it helps to
. acquit the innocent or convict the guilty. Such justifications of
the privilege have been rejected by the Supreme Court43
largely because they fail to capture the logic that the privilege
is intended to protect the innocent as well as the guilty. In
other words, the intuitions in favor of the privilege are just as
strong, often stronger, when the defendant actually committed the crime. Instrumentalist justifications, by ignoring the
protections that the privilege provides to the guilty defendant,
seem to have missed the point. Nevertheless, even if this
problem is set aside, instrumentalist 'justifications of the
privilege fail.
A. The Innocent-But-Nervous Defendant

The privilege could promote truth-seeking in a trial by
decreasing the probability of false negatives (the acquittal of
the guilty) or of false positives (the conviction of the innocent).
The most common instrumentalist justification of the privilege
is that it helps prevent the conviction of innocent-but-nervous
defendants who might perform poorly on the stand.44

43

See Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 413-15 (1966); see also Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) ("The privilege against self-incrimination ... is
not designed to enhance the reliability of the factfinding determination . . . .").
" See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (stating that
"the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to
the innocent'" (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)); Wilson
v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893); Alfred C. Clapp, Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 548 (1956); Ellis, supra note 6, at 846;
Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 327-33.
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The fact that most defendants choose to take the stand45
and the likelihood that the substantial majority of them are in
fact guilty of the offense charged or some lesser offense46 cast
doubt on the idea that the privilege exists to protect the innocent. Of those who choose to assert the privilege, the guilty
must be in the substantial majority. Another problem with this
justification is that the scope of the current privilege is significantly broader than the justification would suggest. For example, a privilege justified in this fashion should not extend to
evidence produced by compelled pretrial self-incrimination.
As long as the pretrial self-incrimination itself was not presented to the jury, the innocent defendant's interests would
be protected:n
1. Adverse Inferences
Furthermore, it would be unlikely for the innocent criminal defendant to assert the privilege if jurors drew adverse
inferences from the refusal to take the stand or positive infer-

45

HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 146 (1966) (91% of
criminal defendants without prior criminal histories and 74% of those with prior
records chose to testify). Remarkably little recent empirical work has been done on
invocations of the privilege. Steven Schulhofer's study of Philadelphia felony trials
in the 1980s suggests that more defendants take the privilege than in Kalven and
Zeisel's day. See Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 329-30. According to his study of 162
felony defendants tried before judges, 49% chose not to testify and 23% of those
who remained silent were acquitted. See Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 329-30 (citing
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037,
1080 (1984)). Given the size of his sample, however, not a great deal can be
drawn from his findings. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra, at 33 (sampling 3,576 trials). In addition, nothing concerning the frequency with which the p~vilege is
invoked in jury trials can be drawn from Schulhofer's study. It is much more
likely that defendants and defense counsel would worry about jurors drawing adverse inferences from silence than judges doing so, since jurors are less likely to
understand or apply the instruction against drawing such inferences. As a result
more defendants are likely to waive the privilege in jury trials.
46
See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENCE xxi (1982); People v. Allen, 420
N.W.2d 499, 549 (Mich. 1988) (Boyle, J., dissenting) ("(T]he safeguards in the system assure us of that which every trial judge and lawyer knows, that 'the preponderant majority' of defendants are guilty of the charged offense or a lesser or
related offense."); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 241 (1966) (observing that "most defendants are
guilty of some crime").
7
'
This narrower scope for the privilege is endorsed in Amar & Lettow, supra
note 4, at 898.
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ences from a willingness to take the stand. The cost of sending
the bad signal or refraining from sending the good signal
would probably outweigh any benefit that would result from
hiding one's poor performance.48 Adverse or positive inferences would drive out a disproportionate number of innocent defendants from the ranks of the silent, since innocent
defendants' prejudicial testimony is likely to be better, on the
average, than guilty defendants'.
To my knowledge, there is not any empirical evidence on
whether juries draw positive inferences from a defendant's
willingness to take the stand. Indeed, forgoing such positive
inferences has not been conceptualized as a cost of asserting
the privilege at all. 49 But there is some statistical and a good
deal of anecdotal evidence that juries tend to look unfavorably
upon those who choose not to testify and that, prosecutorial
silence and judicial admonitions notwithstanding,50 they tend
to factor in the refusal to testify when deciding whether to convict or acquit.51 Because of these adverse inferences, defense

48

See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1075 ("[J]urors 'are so likely to regard a
defendant's failure to testify as evidence of guilt that the innocent defendant is
usually better off taking the stand.").
49
See infra Part II.B. (discussing positive inferences).
50
See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) ("no inference from silence"
instruction from the judge was required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (Fifth Amendment forbids prosecutorial comments on an accused's silence).
51
See JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY 250-51
(1987); VALERIE P. HANS & NEU.. VIDMAR, JUDGING 'lliE JURY 144-45 (1986); LEWIS
MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND 'lliE FIFTH AMENDMENT 21 (1959); Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian Analysis and a Proposed
Overhaul, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 677-78 (1991); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime
Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W.
VA. L. REV. 391, 401 (1980); Kenneth W. Robinson, The Defendant as Witness, 29
DICTA 266, 266 (1952); D.R. Shaffer, The Defendant's Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds., 1985);
D.R. Shaffer & T. Case, On the Decision Not to Testify in One's Own Behalf, 42 J.
PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 353 (1982); Edward B. Williams, The Trial of a
Criminal Case, 29 N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 36, 42 (1957) (99% of cases in 86 federal
judicial districts where criminal defendants chose not to testify resulted in conviction).
The Kalven and Zeisel Chicago Jury Study suggests that jurors draw adverse
inferences from silence. Ninety-one percent of those criminal defendants without
criminal records and seventy-four percent of those with criminal records chose to
testify, something that would be very unlikely if refusing to testify were costless.
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 45, at 146. Although the trials on which Kalven
and Zeisel relied took place in the 1950s, see KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 45, at

1999]

THE PRIVILEGE'S LAST STAND

643

counsel generally advises any defendant with a plausible exculpatory story to testify, unless there is a strong reason not to do
so, such as the fear that the defendant's prior criminal record
will be introduced as impeachment evidence. 52
2. Adverse Selection
That juries draw adverse inferences from a defendant's
failure to testify is more problematic than it seems. An argument can be made that jurors do not draw such inferences,
since, if they did, the principle of adverse selection would lead
all defendants to testify.
Adverse selection can occur when individuals interact
under conditions of asymmetrical access to information.53
33, before the Supreme Court held that comment on a defendant's silence was
impermissible, see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), at the time of these
trials, federal courts and at least three-quarters of the states prohibited such comment, at least by the prosecutor. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272, at
427-33 n.2 (McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter 8 WIGMORE];
Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1075 n.68. Griffin, therefore, is no reason to think that
the percentage has changed significantly. On the paucity of more recent empirical
evidence concerning criminal defendants' invocation of the privilege, see supra note
45.
That adverse inferences from silence are prevalent is supported by evidence
from other criminal justice systems as well. When adverse inferences from silence
were not legally allowed in Singapore, most criminal defendants nevertheless testified. From a sample of 185 cases, Meng Heong Yeo found that 84.3% of defendants testified and 9.2% made unsworn statements under a rule that allowed such
statements to be submitted without cross-examination, for a total of 93.5% offering
testimony of some form. After adverse inferences were allowed and the possibility
of making an unsworn statement was removed, Yeo found from a sample of 115
cases that 89.1% of defendants testified. See Meng Heong Yeo, Diminishing the
Right to Silence: The Singapore Experience, 1983 CRIM. L. REv. 89, 96-99. The fact
that the change to a rule allowing for adverse inferences led to no increase in the
percentage of defendants testifying suggests that fact-finders were drawing adverse
inferences from silence to begin with. The Singaporean evidence is not directly
applicable to the United States, however, because Singapore has had bench trials
for most criminal cases since 1960 and for all criminal cases since 1969. See id. at
89 & n.5.
With the passage of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, ch. 33,
§§ 34-38 (Eng.), which allowed jurors to draw adverse inferences from silence,
Great Britain offers another opportunity to observe changes in the frequency with
which defendants testify before and after adverse inferences from silence are allowed.
52
See ANTHONY G. AMsTERDAM ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CASES § 390 (1989); lA CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 29.06, at 2952-53 (M. Eisenstein et al. eds., 1983).
53
George Ak.erloff exainined this phenomenon in connection with the market
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Such asymmetry exists between the defendant and jury when
the defendant chooses to remain silent. Defendants alone are
in a good position to know the value of their testimony, that is,
how favorable or prejudicial it is. If juries attempt to predict
the value of the withheld evidence as accurately as possible,
they will estimate it to be the average value of withheld testimony. But defendants will choose silence only if the value of
their testimony is less than or equal to the jury's estimate. AB
defendants with better (or less prejudicial) testimony waive the
privilege, juries lower their estimates of the average value of
withheld testimony, leading more defendants to waive. In the
end, no defendant chooses to remain silent.54
But, as we all know, some defendants choose to remain
silent. How is this possible if jurors draw adverse inferences?
The most obvious explanation is that not all jurors draw such
inferences. Since unanimity is generally required to convict,55
it would be reasonable to risk bringing about adverse inferences in some jurors' minds in order to withhold strongly prejudicial testimony from those jurors who would not draw such
inferences. Another possibility is that the judge's admonitions
cause juries to place an absolute limit on their adverse inferences that is sufficiently favorable to defendants that some still
find it in their interest to exercise the privilege.
It may also be that juries are somewhat naive, that is,
that they do not continually update their estimates of the withheld testimony's value on the basis of changes in defendants'
strategies. The fact that jurors are typically not repeat players

for used automobiles. See George A Akerloff, The Market for •Lemons•: Quality,
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). Such a result
is what is known in game theory as a pooling equilibrium, in which uninformed
players are not able to draw inferences about informed players' type as a result of
the informed players' choices.
!• The phenomenon of unraveling in connection with the privilege is discussed
in DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 90-91 (1994).
es Unanimity is not required of a twelve-member jury under the Sixth
Amendment, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356 (1972), although it is required of a six-member jury. See Burch v.
Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979). Nevertheless, as of 1996, all but two states required unanimity for convictions for anything more serious than a simple misdemeanor. See Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment in Jury Reform, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 133, 138 n.24 (1996).
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would tend to support the notion that juries would not update
their beliefs, unless information concerning the strategies of
defendants were transmitted to the jury pool.56
Yet another possibility is that juries are unaware of all of
the reasons defendants might have to exercise the privilege. AI!,
a result, they would be unable to draw all available negative
inferences from defendants' choices to withhold testimony. A
particularly strong possibility is that juries' ignorance concerning the law of evidence leads them to ignore the fact that defendants may refuse to take the stand to prevent the prosecutor from introducing prior convictions.57 If juries do not interpret failure to take the stand as evidence of prior convictions,
defendants will continue to have an incentive to exercise
the privilege as a means of keeping prior convictions from
thejury.58
It seems clear then that the fact that some defendants
assert the privilege is compatible with jurors' drawing adverse
inferences. And because they do generally draw such inferences, it is unlikely that many innocent defendants would have
testimony that was so bad that they would find it in their
interest to assert the privilege. Not many innocent defendants
would take the chance of creating an adverse inference in a
significant percentage of jurors' minds merely to withhold from
n Another possibility is that it is the defendants who are naive. If defendants
did not take into account changes in adverse inferences, and juries knew they did
not, juries would have no reason to further reduce their adverse inferences as a
result of defendants' responses. But since criminal defendants and particularly
criminal defense counsel are much more likely to be repeat players, this is unlikely.
57
See FED. R. EVID. 609.
58
Kalven and Zeisel's Chicago Jury Study suggests that prior criminal history
is an important factor to criminal defendants when making the decision to take
the stand. Although 91% of criminal defendants without prior criminal histories
chose to take the stand, only 74% of those with prior records chose to testify. See
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 45, at 146. Defense counsel generally takes prior
criminal history strongly into account when deciding whether or not to recommend
that the defendant take the stand. See AMsTERDAM ET AL., supra note 52, § 390.
Correlating the frequency with which the privilege is asserted with the extent
to which a state's evidence law allows the presentation of prior criminal history as
impeachment evidence could help corroborate this theory. Another possibility would
be to compare the frequency with which the privilege is asserted in federal rape,
sexual assault, and child molestation cases with its frequency in other federal
criminal cases. The former cases are governed by Ru1es 413 and 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which are more liberal in allowing the presentation of the
defendant's past criminal history even when he fails to take the stand.
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the jury what, given their innocence, is unlikely to be highly
prejuducial testimony.
3. Risk-Aversion and Innocent Defendants
In addition, there is reason to believe that the privilege
often fails to benefit some of those remaining innocent defendants who exercise it. Assume that defendants do not know the
value of their testimony, but, unlike juries, know more about
its expected value. Someone who is risk averse would be more
likely to choose the more certain result of the jury's adverse
inference than take his chances by testifying, even if the expected value of his testimony is greater than the adverse inference. Since criminals are generally greater risk takers,59 innocent defendants should be more likely to choose the adverse
inference, all other things being equal, than the guilty. These
risk-averse, but innocent, defendants would be more likely'to
be acquitted if they were compelled to testify. This same phenomenon is one of the reasons plea bargaining is problematic.
Given equal probabilities of conviction, the innocent are less
likely than the guilty to take their chances at trial and thus
more likely to accept a plea bargain, leading to a misallocation
of criminal punishment.60

B. The Privilege and Positive Inferences
Perhaps it is by allowing the innocent defendant to signal
his innocence by willingly taking the stand that the privilege
most effectively protects the innocent. If all defendants were

59

See Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerety, Some Experimental Euidence on
Differences between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 123 (1995) (finding that criminals are less risk-averse than
students). That is why certainty of punishment is probably more important for
deterrence than the level of punishment. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & John R. Lott,
Jr., Low-Probability-High-Penalty Enforcement Strategies and the Efficient Operation
of the Plea-Bargaining System, 12 INT'L R. OF L. & ECON. 69, 70 (1992); Daniel
Nagin, General Deterrence: A Reuiew of the Empirical Euidence, in DETERRENCE
AND INCAPACITATION 95-111 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978).
60
See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1948-49 (1992). For the view that, when differential defense costs
are taken into account, plea bargaining does not produce significant adverse sorting, see Kobayashi & Lott, supra note 59.
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routinely compelled to testify, innocent defendants could not
transmit this information to the jury.
Criminal defense attorneys certainly encourage juries to
draw positive inferences from their clients' willingness to testify. Although forgoing this positive inference can be thought of
as a cost of exercising the privilege, and therefore as the practical equivalent of an adverse inference, its constitutional permissibility has been questioned only in the context of trials in
which there is a silent co-defendant who might be directly
harmed through such inferences.61 We can assume that juries
do not feel any compunction about drawing positive inferences
from the defendant's willingness to testify. But is it reasonable
to do so?
We have understood a defendant's choice to testify as a
response to the value of his testimony rather than a response
to his actual" innocence or guilt. Innocent defendants with testimony of low value are disinclined to testify, and guilty defendants with testimony of high value are inclined to testify. If
this is the case, the choice to waive the privilege should reveal
only that the defendant has testimony that was better than the
adverse inference-something that the jury will be able to see
by examining the testimony itself. The information about the
defendant communicated to the jury would be the same as in a
system of compelled testimony.
But perhaps it is not true that defendants look only to the
value of their testimony when deciding whether to take the
stand. Perhaps the innocent have a natural tendency to want
to express their innocence. If that were the case, juries might
find that a testifying defendant is innocent to a greater degree
than would be justified solely by the value of his testimony.
Testifying might also justify positive inferences if the
guilty habitually underestimated or the innocent habitually
overestimated the value of their testimony. For example, the
innocent might generally think that their testimony appears
more credible than it actually does. If the jury realized this
and so drew a positive inference from the choice to testify, an
1

See, e.g., United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hines, 455 F.2d 1317, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Blue, 440 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607,
621-22 (7th Cir. 1969); 8 JAMES MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE i 14.04[3)
(2d ed. 1981).
'
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incredible but innocent testifier would be more likely to be
acquitted in a system with the privilege than in one in which
all defendants' testimony was compelled.
But if any positive inferences did exist, they would likely
be small, since the value of the testimony would surely remain
the dominant factor in the defendant's choice to take the stand.
More importantly, if there were an evidentiary link between
testifying and innocence that led juries to draw positive inferences from a defendant's taking the stand, there would be no
reason why guilty defendants could not take advantage of
them as well by copying the signal.62
Because no significant correlation between the choice to
take the stand and innocence is likely and because any correlation that would exist would create a signal that could be copied
by the guilty, it is very unlikely that juries do draw positive
inferences from taking the stand.63 Positive inferences cannot
justify the privilege.
C. Torture and Probable Cause
Some have argued that the privilege is justified because it
protects the innocent against the admission of coerced (and so
unreliable) confessions. 64 Clearly the privilege is not necessary to exclude a confession that the defendant can demonstrate was coerced. The exclusion of such confessions as unreliable has existed under the common law since the mid-eighteenth century and would have adequate constitutional
grounding (via due process) without the invocation of the privilege.65 It may be, however, that the state's ability to rely upon
62

An analogous situation occurs in plea bargaining. Since the innocent are
more likely to prevail at trial than the guilty, one would expect them to be more
likely to hold out during plea bargaining. But the prosecution cannot treat the
tendency to hold out as a signal of innocence (by offering benefits to holdouts)
without encouraging the guilty to copy the signal. The guilty can hold out (at
least in the beginning of plea bargaining) at little cost to themselves, so there is
little reason for them not to copy the signal.
63
Because such inferences are unlikely, the lack of constitutional scrutiny of
positive inferences is understandable, even if forgoing them can be understood as a
cost of asserting the privilege.
64
See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (stating that
privilege reflects "our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatments and abuses"); see also Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 325-27.
65
3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE§ 819, at 17 (McNaughton rev.
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the defendant as a source of evidence can tempt it to use its
power to coerce incriminating testimony. A right of silence
might force the state to look for independent and more reliable
forms of evidence.66
Even assuming that the privilege does perform this prophylactic function-which could be questioned, since one probably can be coerced into waiving the privilege just as easily as
one can be coerced into confessing67-such an argument would
justify only a right of silence during pre-trial interrogations.
Torture in the courtroom is very unlikely and the state will not
be encouraged to rely solely upon the defendant's testimony if
it will not know what that testimony will be until trial.
The argument that the privilege discourages the state
from engaging in fishing expeditions68 fails for similar reasons. First of all, the Fourth Amendment provides protection
against interrogation without probable cause.69 Furthermore,
even if the state's ability to rely upon the defendant as a
source of evidence against him encourages it to interrogate
without probable cause (in the hope that the defendant will
confess to a crime) such a worry can be addressed fully by a
right of silence before trial.

1961 & Supp. 1995). The Supreme Court explicitly accepted this common law
requirement as a matter of federal evidence law in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574
(1884). Although the Court later held the voluntariness requirement to be derived
from the privilege itself, see Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897), it
continued to apply it to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, at the time when this clause was not taken to have incorporated the
privilege. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Later the state
voluntariness standard too was held to fall under the privilege. See Davis v. North
Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966). The privilege was incorporated in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
66
See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 325-27.
67
See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1078. Amar and Lettow suggest that judicial
supervision of the interrogation process would do much more to prevent police
intimidation than the privilege. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 894.
68
See O'Brien, supra note 15, at 33.
69
Kent Greenawalt argues that the "private moral analogue" to the privilege is
one's right to refuse to answer questions about one's conduct when only a slender
basis for suspicion exists. Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 26-27. But this private
right serves to justify only the Fourth Amendment public right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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D. The Privilege Helps Restore a Balance of Advantages Between the Criminal Defendant and the State
Sometimes the privilege is claimed to contribute to the
truth-seeking process by counter-balancing the state's advantages in resources, thereby ensuring a "fair fight" between the
criminal defendant and the state.70 This fairness might be
understood in terms of the morality of warfare or the individualistic and contractarian principles standing behind the adversarial system. Such arguments will be dealt with in Parts
IV and V. But it might also be understood as requiring some
equality of strength between prosecution and defense as a
means of fostering the truth-seeking functions of the trial.
But so understood, this argument for the privilege is weak.
Given that the state must pursue a large number of cases and
the defendant only one, it is not clear that the state does enjoy
an advantage in resources,71 particularly since the defendant
is usually much more motivated than the prosecution. In addition, the mere fact that a distribution of power in favor of the
prosecution exists in one area does not mean that, all things
considered, the balance of power between defense and prosecution is not even. 72 For example, the prosecution bears the special burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt to
the satisfaction of all jurors.
Let us assume that the state does have some advantage.
How does this advantage thwart the truth-seeking aspects of
the trial? The rules of evidence assure that only relevant evidence of the defendant's guilt may be presented by the prosecution. Accordingly, it would appear that the greater the
prosecution's ability to present evidence, the greater the
chance that the guilty will be convicted. Indeed, since the prosecution is required to turn over to the defense all exculpatory
evidence in advance of trial,73 a good deal of the resources of
the state will end up benefiting the innocent defendant.

70

See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964);

EDWARD

CLEARY

ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 118 (3d ed. 1984); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 51,

§ 2251, at 317-18; O'Brien, supra note 15, at 37; Silver, supra note 2.
71
See William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1703, 1707, 1712-13 (1993).
72
See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1980).
73
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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Relevant evidence of guilt can be found concerning innocent defendants as well. As a result, the material advantages
of the state will also increase the chances of the conviction of
the innocent. Still, since more evidence of guilt must be available against the guilty than against the innocent, increased
state resources will not increase the innocent's chances of conviction to the same extent as the guilty's. Furthermore, if one
really wished to increase the innocent's chance of acquittal,
enabling the defendant to discover and present exculpating
evidence, which would benefit the innocent more than the
guilty, would be the most reasonable method.74 Finally, even
if one did decide to limit the state's ability to present evidence
as a means of ensuring that more defendants, both innocent
and guilty, are acquitted, why is the privilege the appropriate
limitation? Why not limit prosecutors' budgets or require that
they work no more than 40 hours a week? An argument for
hamstringing prosecutors is not yet an argument for the particular limitations in the privilege against self-incrimination.

E. The Privilege and the Presumption of Innocence
Although often ignored by legal academics, many jurists
and lay-people hold the view that the privilege flows from the
presumption of innocence,75 which is itself thought to contribute to the truth-seeking function of the trial by establishing a

14

See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1076-77.
See Editorial, The Right to Silence, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 17 (noting
perceived connection between privilege and "the hallowed rule that a suspect is
not required to prove his innocence"). The European Court of Human Rights has
found the privilege "closely linked to the presumption of innocence contained in
Article 6 § 2 of the [European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms]." Saunders v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 313, 337
(1996). Article 6(2) guarantees that charged persons "shall be presumed innocent
until proven guilty according to law." European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228 (Nov. 4,
1950); see also Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955).
For examples of legal academics who have suggested that there is a relationship between the two, see William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH.
L. REV. 329, 340-41 (1995); Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to
Silence and Moues Towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J . CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 402, 403 (1994); and Barton L. Ingraham, The Right of Silence, The
Presumption of Innocence, The Burden of Proof, and a Modest Proposal: A Reply to
O'Reilly, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 559, 560 (1996).
15
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proper balance between the goals of convicting the guilty and
acquitting the innocent.76
Although the presumption of innocence has been universally praised,77 there is a longstanding controversy over just
what it means. One interpretation treats it as a proxy for the
rules that proof of guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the state has the burden of proof
throughout the trial.78 Clearly, compelling the defendant to
answer truthfully questions directed to him is not in conflict
with the reasonable doubt standard. One can require the jury
to convict only if it has no reasonable doubt concerning the
defendant's guilt without thereby restricting sources of evidence against the defendant.
The privilege also cannot be derived from the rule that
imposes the burden of proof on the state. Nothing about the
state's bearing the burden of proof puts a limit on whom the
state may call to fulfill this burden. Since the state may satisfy this burden by calling third-party witnesses and compelling
non-testimonial evidence from the defendant/9 there appears
to be no reason why it cannot do so by calling the defendant as
a testimonial witness.80 The state would still be bearing the
burden of proof because it would have to call the defendant as
a witness and present evidence through the defendant,
and other sources, sufficient to satisfy this burden. Although
the plaintiff in a civil case generally bears the burden of
proof, he may meet this burden by calling the defendant as a
testimonial witness.

76

See Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 459-61 (1989).
77
See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); Deutch v. United States,
367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895);
George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-ofPersuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 880 (1968); William S.
Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REv. 329, 337-38 (1995).
78
See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 491 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jeff Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 WIS. L. REv. 441, 460.
79
See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (requiring defendant to give
voice exemplar not in violation of the privilege); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967) (same for writing sample); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(same for blood sample).
80
See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1084.
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Another understanding of the presumption of innocence
concerns what posture the jury must have when it begins to
assess the evidence presented during the trial.81 The state
could be saddled with a meaningful burden of proof even if all
juries began trials believing that the defendant was not a credible witness and was probably guilty of the offense charged.
Even under these circumstances, the state would still have to
present evidence of every element before the guilt of the defendant could be entertained by the jury, and this evidence would
have to be sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubts before
conviction could occur. But the actual burden of the
state would certainly be made easier if the jurors were predisposed to convict. Under this second interpretation, the presumption of innocence is meant to ensure that the jury begins
deliberation with its beliefs weighted in favor of the
defendant's innocence.
The privilege might appear to follow from the presumption
of innocence in this second sense when one considers the consequences of a refusal to testify if the privilege were abolished.
If the jury were legally permitted to draw adverse inferences
from the defendant's refusal to testify, then, one might argue,
the silent defendant would go through the trial presumedly
guilty, in violation of the presumption offactual innocence.82
But the presumption of factual innocence concerns the
jury's ex ante beliefs; it does not mean that the jury must ignore information concerning guilt presented to it during the
trial. For example, if the prosecution places the defendant at
the scene of the crime and the defendant offers no alibi, it is
not contrary to the presumption of innocence for the jury to
hold the defendant's failure to offer an explanation of his
whereabouts against him. Likewise, the defendant's failure to
testify on his own behalf during trial is itself a new datum that
can suggest guilt. Indeed it is precisely because the jury presumes that the defendant is innocent that his silence provides
unfavorable information about him. If the jury assumed he was
guilty, his silence would not apP.ear unusual and so would not
be a reason to increase the probability of his guilt. 83

81
12
13

See generally Laufer, supra note 75.
See Ingraham, supra note 75, at 562-65; O'Reilly, supra note 75, at 445-51.
Cf. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 46.
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If the consequence of a refusal to testify were a contempt
sanction rather than an adverse inference, then the absence of
a connection between the privilege and the presumption of
innocence would be even clearer. A contempt sanction has no
relationship to the jury's belief about the defendant's guilt.
And once the defendant, as a result of the threat of contempt
sanctions, took the stand, the jury could assess his testimony
in accordance with the presumption of innocence. The jury
could begin its assessment with the assumption that he is
innocent and is a credible witness.

F. The Privilege and the Exculpatory Witness
Some have argued that the privilege aids in the acquittal
of the innocent, because it encourages exculpatory third-party
witnesses to come forward, by removing the fear that they
might be compelled to incriminate themselves.84 But thirdparty witnesses who take advantage of the privilege still risk
providing authorities with notice that they are worthy of investigation. In general, it is only the possibilities of immunity
from prosecution or prosecution only for a lesser offense, possibilities that would exist even if the privilege were abolished,
that motivate such witnesses to come forward.
Indeed, the ability of an exculpatory witness to exercise
the privilege is more likely to keep an innocent defendant from
mounting an adequate defense.85 The witness's right to silence is in tension with the defendant's right to compulsory
process. 86 Although the burden that the privilege puts on in-

" See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 51, § 2251, at 311.
85
See Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 861-64; see also Peter W. Tague, The
Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an Impediment to the Innocent One, 78 GEO. L.J. 1 (1989).
86
A witness's invocation of the privilege has been held to override a criminal
defendant's right to compulsory process. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 444 (1972); Gleason v. Welborn 42 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 1994).
If the criminal defendant were able to admit the exculpatory witness's invocation of the privilege or call him to the stand to force him to exercise his privilege in front of the jury, then the conflict between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments would be less than it seems, since such invocations would very likely create
a reasonable doubt in jurors' minds. But because jurors in a criminal case are not
allowed to draw adverse inferences against a witness (and in favor of the defendant) from the witness's assertion of the privilege, see United States v. Harris, 542
F.2d 1283, 1298 (7th Cir. 1976) ("The defendants have no right to have the jury
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nocent defendants' ability to mount an adequate defense might
be remedied by allowing defendants or judges to compel the
prosecution to grant immunity,87 neither currently has this
power.88 Furthermore, it is questionable whether they could

draw inferences from the witnesses' exercise of [the Fifth Amendment] right.");
United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1974) (neither side has
the right to benefit from witness's invocation of privilege); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir. 1973); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394,
398 (D.C. Cir. 1950), invocations of the privilege by nonparty witnesses are not
admissible in criminal cases and courts do not give criminal defendants the right
to call a nonparty witness solely for the purpose of having the witness assert his
privilege in front of the jury, unless there is a special relationship between the
defendant and the witness, such as an agency relationship. See United States v.
Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 883 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. George, 778 F.2d 556,
562-63 (lOth Cir. 1985); United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144, 1147-49 (6th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Ritz, 548 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bolts, 558
F.2d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 1977); Royal v. Maryland, 529 F.2d 1280, 1281 (4th Cir.
1976) (per curiam); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1298 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Johnson, 488
F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. King, 461 F.2d 53, 57 & n.4 (8th
Cir. 1972); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en
bane); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970). But see FDIC v
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 45 F.3d 969, 978 (5th Cir. 1995).
For arguments in favor of giving the criminal defendant a general right to
present a witness's invocation of the privilege, see Aaron Van Oort, Comment,
Invocations as Evidence: Admitting Nonparty Witness Invocations of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 65 U. C.m. L. REv. 1435 (1998); Michael Cook, Comment, Denying a Criminal Defendant the Opportunity to Call a Witness Who Will
Invoke His Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 54 DENV. L.J.
205 (1977).
87
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002, a witness can be compelled to testify despite
his invocation of the privilege, "but no testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1999). This "immunity statute" was held constitutional in Knstigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
" Courts have generally rejected the idea that the Compulsory Process Clause
could be violated by a prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity. See, e.g., United
States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1987). An exception to· the rule
against court-ordered immunity is when such immunity is used as a remedy for
prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Smith, 995 F.2d 662, 676 (7th Cir.
1993); United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1992); United States
v. Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d
1397, 1401-03 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Montoya 945 F.2d 1068, 1078 (9th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Anguillo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1190-03 (1st. Cir. 1990);
United States v. Capozzi, 883 F.2d 608, 613 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Graveley, 840 F. 2d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d
1302, 1310 (lOth Cir. 1987); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.
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be given this power without seriously prejudicing prosecutors'
effectiveness.89

G. Conclusion
In sum, the privilege is not likely to protect the innocent.
And no one has seriously tried to justify the privilege on the
grounds that. it aids in the conviction of the guilty. Because it
prevents the government from obtaining or making use of
evidence of guilt, the privilege must decrease the probability
that the guilty will be convicted.90

III.

TRADITIONAL RIGHTS-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE
PRIVILEGE AND THEIR WEAKNESSES

It is undoubtedly because of the weakness of instrumentalist justifications that most defenders of the privilege appeal to
those rights or interests of criminal defendants that might
trump the state's interest in efficient law enforcement.

1976). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 995 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.
1993); United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 991 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.
Lugg, 892 F.2d 101, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit has entertained the
possibility of more expansive use of court-ordered immunity to allow defendants to
exercise fully their right to compulsory process however. See Virgin Islands v.
Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969-72 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d
1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978).
88
A judicial grant of immunity for a defense witness conflicts with prosecutorial interests because granting such immunity will mean that the prosecution will
have to prove that none of its case against the witness was derived from her
testimony. This can be a substantial burden. See James F. Flanagan, Compelled
Immunity for Defense Witnesses: Hidden Costs and Questions, 56 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447, 461-63 (1981). In addition, the prosecution has reason to worry that one
criminal defendant will use defense witness immunity to give his accomplices an
immunity bath. One may wonder whether courts are in as good a position as
prosecutors to assess the likelihood of such consequences. See United States v.
Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775-77 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Peter Westen, Incredible
Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66
IOWA L. REV. 741, 766-67 (1981) (criticizing this argument). Those who argue for
defense witness immunity tend to downplay the disadvantages to the prosecution.
See Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 169-70
(1974).
90
See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1074.
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A. The Impossibility Argument

A common argument, similar to the cruel trilemma argument, in favor of the privilege is that self-incrimination runs
counter to the natural human instinct for self-preservation.
One cannot be expected to override this instinct, thus one is
excused from having to try.91 This argument, however, proves
too much. Should we not, for the same reason, refuse to condemn defendants for attempting to cover up their wrongdoing
by destroying evidence or for attempting to resist arrest or to
escape punishment?92 Furthermore, since civil sanctions can
often be as onerous as criminal penalties, the impossibility
argument would appear to justify a privilege in civil as well as
criminal proceedings.
In addition, by punishing the silent or perjurious, it is
possible to make confession in the criminal defendant's selfinterest. Indeed, this is the whole point of compelling self-incrimination. It may be that self-incrimination cannot be compelled, in the sense that defendants will always choose contempt or perjury no matter what, but this question cannot be
answered by pointing to the fact that self-incrimination is
strongly against the defendant's self-interest: The consequences of contempt or perjury may weigh even more strongly
in the balance.
Even if it were the case that defendants would simply
refuse to speak on the stand or, what is more likely, would lie
in response to the questions placed to them, it does not follow
that compelling the defendant to take the stand would be useless. Even a defendant's lies are useful to the prosecution, and
if the criminal defendant categorically refused to respond,
giving the jury the opportunity to observe his demeanor while
being questioned could still be useful.
Furthermore, the fact that the defendant could not but
violate the duty to speak truthfully does not mean that silence
or perjury should not be punished. Even if it is the case that
one can be sanctioned only for failing to perform those duties

11

See CLEARY ET AL., supra note 70, § 118, at 287; Stuntz, supra note 6; Lane
V. Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Principle: Miranda v. Arizona
and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 171, 179-82 (1979).
n See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1097.
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that one could have successfully discharged, 93 the defendant's
inability to satisfy his duty to testify truthfully is only apparent. He could have satisfied this duty had he not committed a
crime. 94 It is for this same reason that we consider the person
who freely makes two conflicting promises to have breached
the one he chooses not to fulfill. Although breach of a promise
is inevitable, it is so only because of an earlier choice that
could have been avoided and that he had a duty to avoid. The
impossibility argument ignores the free choices that placed
the defendant in a situation where truthful testimony is to
his disadvantage.

B. The Privilege Protects Against Bad Laws
The privilege has been celebrated most when employed by
defendants in response to unjustified, immoral, or unconstitutional state action, for example, state-sponsored religious orthodoxy or McCarthyism. 95 Could the privilege exist to put a
check on improper action by the state? Is the privilege a final
defense against bad laws? Indeed, the privilege appears tailored to frustrate a particular type of bad law, namely, one

93

This requirement is by no means self-evident. First of all, there is the comprehensive question of whether anyone can do otherwise than what he does, given
the causal necessitation of human action. Such necessitation need not be understood in terms of physical laws. Action in accordance with the laws of empirical
psychology can give rise to the same worries about causal determinism. See DAVID
HOME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 90-111 (Charles W.
Hendel ed., 1955) (1748). If one's actions are necessitated by one's beliefs and desires according to the laws of empirical psychology and one does not choose these
laws or one's beliefs and desires (or chooses beliefs and desires in a manner necessitated by other beliefs and desires one does not choose), then arguably one cannot
choose what actions one performs. Unless one is willing to deny that anyone is
culpable for his acts, one must, it seems, admit that a person can be culpable for
acts he could not but perform.
Even assuming that free action is possible, there are many situations where
moral culpability depends upon events beyond one's control in a philosophically
unproblematic sense. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK:
Plm.oSOPIDCAL PAPERS 1971-1980 20 (1981); Kenneth W. Simons, When is Strict
Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1105-19 (1997).
94
See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1097-1100.
95
See Fortas, supra note 24, at 98, 101-04.
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that penalizes unpopular opinions.96 Such laws are often enforceable only through the defendant's own testimony.
But, so understood, the privilege is grossly over-inclusive,
since it also thwarts the enforcement of all laws, good and
bad.97 In addition, the privilege is under-inclusive, because it
provides very limited protections against the enforcement of
bad laws, by preventing only evidence gathering concerning
them (and only one avenue of evidence gathering at that).
Constitutional provisions, such as the First Amendment, that
entirely prevent enforcement of offending statutes would be a
method better tailored to address such concerns.98 Indeed,
there appears to be something contradictory about this theory
of the privilege. If the laws are offensive, they should be made
constitutionally void. If they are not offensive, then there is no
reason to frustrate their enforcement at all.
C. The Privacy Argument
Is compelled self-incrimination wrong because it invades
the defendant's privacy?99 If the privilege protects the right of
privacy, however, it should also reasonably extend to testimony
in civil cases and nontestimonial evidence in criminal cases,
both of which often involve very private and embarrassing
matters. 100 In addition, privacy would apparently be violated
by compelled self-incrimination whether or not one is given
immunity: The privacy argument cannot explain immunity
statutes.101 It is also unclear why incursions into one's private sphere are any worse when proceeding through compelled
self-incrimination than when proceeding through other forms
of discovery. Indeed, the privilege can encourage the police to
pursue avenues of investigation that are even more detrimental to one's own and others' privacy.

" See Alan Donagan, The Right Not to Incriminate Oneself, 1 Soc. PHIL. &
137, 143-44 (1984).
17
See BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 195-99; Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1085-87.
" See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1085-87.
" See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
100
See Amar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 47.
101
See Am.ar & Lettow, supra note 4, at 47; Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1234.
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D. The Argument from Autonomy
Although couched in terms of privacy, some arguments in
favor of the privilege are less concerned with shielding facts
from disclosure than with protecting the criminal defendant's
moral psychology. Compelling self-incrimination is claimed to
interfere with the defendant's moral assessment of his actions:102 "The fifth amendment, standing for the high value
placed on personal responsibility, rebukes government when,
by omission or commission, it inhibits, stultifies, or interrupts
the process by which the accused decides what to do about
whatever criminal responsibility rests at his doorstep."103
Compelled self-incrimination is objectionable because it
amounts to a form of "self-condemnation on command."104
It appears that compelled self-incrimination could interfere
with the defendant's moral psychology only if it inspired some
expression, whether genuine or feigned, of a moral attitude.
Otherwise, it would have no connection with the moral psychology of the defendant at all. But in most cases the defendant would be required to give only very specific facts-for
example, where he was on the night of the third-the revealing
of which would not be sufficient in itself to express a violation
of the law, much less moral self-condemnation.105
A second problem is that civil law, especially tort law,
contains a strong moral dimension. Accordingly, a privilege in
civil cases would appear to be justified. In addition, the selfcondemnatory aspect of self-incrimination seems unrelated to
whether one is a defendant or merely an immunized witness.
Autonomy arguments cannot explain immunity statutes.
Setting aside these problems to get to the heart of the
argument, why is inspiring self-condemnation through selfincrimination a bad thing? If, as Gerstein claims, criminal
defendants self-condemn because they "feel themselves to be
part of the same moral community with those whose interests

102

See Gerstein, supra note 6; Robert S. Gerstein, Punishment and Self-lneriminatwn, 16 AM. J. JURIS. 84 (1971); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: SelfIncrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 343,
345-56 (1979) [hereinafter Gerstein, Demise]; Schrock et al., supra note 6.
103
Schrock et al., supra note 6, at 49.
104
Gerstein, Demise, supra note 102, at 349.
105
See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1130-37.
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they have injured,"106 then it would appear that they are simply becoming sensitive to the commitments they have always
held, rather than having their attitudes interfered with. If so,
what is wrong with. providing a setting for the criminal defendant to reflect on what he really thinks of his acts? Indeed, the
entire process of prosecution cannot help but provide the defendant with such opportunities.
1. Autonomy and Integrity
Perhaps what is objectionable about compelled self-incrimination is that the expression of self-condemnation is out of
step with the defendant's actual moral commitments. Encouraging such feigned self-condemnation interferes with the
defendant's moral psychology by inducing hypocrisy or opportunism. The defendant's integrity would be protected by the
privilege.107 Integrity is a virtue that even someone who has
improper moral commitments should nevertheless possess.
This argument is vulnerable on a number of fronts. First,
it is questionable whether a significant number of criminal
acts are motivated by consistent and coherent sets of moral
principles that are contrary to those principles standing behind
criminal laws. Those committing criminal acts who attempt to
justify their actions are far more likely to rely upon the misapplication of doctrines, such as excuse or mitigation, that are
generally accepted by the broader community.108 If the defendant has no moral outlook contrary to that of the state, then
he cannot suffer a loss of integrity.

Gerstein, supra note 6, at 91.
Integrity can be understood to include the disposition to act in accordance
with and honestly state one's primary values and principles even if it is costly to
do so. See MARTIN BENJAMIN, SPLI'ITING THE DIFFERENCE 51 (1990); STEPHEN L.
CARTER, INTEGRITY 7 (1996); Cheshire Calhoun, Standing for Something, 92 J.
PHIL. 235 (1995).
toe See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1135-36. Of course, if the criminal defendant
had a principled and consistent moral outlook under which these doctrines should
be expanded beyond their normal scope, then to compel him to say or imply otherwise might still undermine his integrity. But excuse or mitigation is more likely to
be misapplied, in the sense that the criminal defendant does not apply these doctrines consistently to similar criminal actions outside of his own case (and in particular would not apply them to similar criminal actions when doing so would
disadvantage him).
toe
107
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Second, the right to integrity does not appear to be sufficiently strong to trump the efficient enforcement of criminal
laws. Is it so important that the defendant not express attitudes out of keeping with his own moral views that we should
set up barriers to the prosecution of murders and rapes?
Finally, there is ample opportunity within the context of
the trial for the defendant to express his opposition to the
law .109 And if there is not, the state could easily expand the
opportunities. Indeed, it is hard to see how integrity is fostered
by allowing the defendant to be silent about his actions. If
anything, a right of silence allows the defendant to escape
integrity's demand that he be honest about his moral views
and the actions that he believed followed from them. 110
2. Autonomy and Unconditionality
Perhaps the problem is not that the moral self-condemnation is feigned but that it is the expression of new attitudes
that are somehow inadequate. Compelled self-incrimination
might be improper because it fails as a form of moral
education.
The problem with compelled self-incrimination might be
the state's assertion of moral authority over the defendant. A
Kantian intuition resonates in this idea. As Kant famously
argued, one who abides by his duty because of divine command
acts heteronomously rather than autonomously. 111 This individual does not recognize the moral law as categorical because
the justification for his actions appeals to a will other than his
own. If he keeps his promises only because God commands it,
he does not treat promise-keeping as having value in itself.
That is, if he were later convinced that God thought promisebreaking was good, he would do that instead. According to
Kant, genuine moral reasoning involves recognizing obligations
that are not contingent upon any authority.112
109

Examples can be found in the trial of the character Moosbrugger in RoBERT
MUSIL, I THE MAN WITHOUT QUALITIES 74-85 (Eithne Wilkins & Ernst Kaiser
trans. 1953) (1930).
110
See Richard Dein Winfield, Rethinking the Legal Process, 39 AM. J. JURIS.
153, 161 (1994).
111

See IMMANuEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 110-11

(H.J. Paton trans. 1964) (1791).
112
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 459-61 (1971) (outlining Kantian
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Contingency of obligation is also the reason that Kant
thought abiding by one's duty out of fear of retaliation is not
autonomous. 113 Those who abide by their duty for this reason
will not be motivated to do their duty when all threats of
retaliation are gone. Recognition of one's duty is supposed to
provide a motive for action that will not depend upon such
contingent events.
Can one argue that compelled self-incrimination motivates
self-condemnation in a manner that is heteronomous, because
the defendant responds to the state's authority or a fear of
retaliation when he incriminates himself? Does compelled selfincrimination fail to inspire a recognition that one's actions
were categorically wrong?114
Criticisms of compelled self-incrimination on the grounds
that it cannot morally educate are similar to common
criticisms of shaming sanctions.116 Shame depends upon an
appreciation of others' opinion of oneself, and so might encourage merely contingent reasons to abide by one's duties. If
one is hidden from view or one's actions no longer receive
a negative response from others, then shame no longer provides a reason to abide by one's duties. Guilt, in contrast, is
a moral attitude toward breach of one's duties that is
properly unconditional. 116
theory of moral education).
113
See KANT, supra note 111, at 108-10.
11
' One problem with this argument is that even if the criminal defendant acts
heteronomously on the stand, it is hard to see how he is made more heteronomous
than he was before. Presumably self-incrimination leads to self-condemnation because the authorities with which the defendant identifies shift from his criminal
subculture to society as a whole. But if so, then he was equally heteronomous
before the state compelled him to self-incriminate.
115
For an example of the advocation of shaming sanctions, see Dan M. Kahan,
What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 591 (1996).
116
See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 733, 765-67 (1998); James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shaming Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1079-82 (1998). Shaming punishments have
also been criticized on the grounds that they are least likely to be effective (or
may even be counterproductive) in connection with those who fail to identify with
the general community, that is, with precisely those most likely to commit crimes,
see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1880, 1918-19 (1991), and that modem culture lacks the type of repeated
interaction between individuals or emphasis on social conformity that allow for
shaming to be effective. See id. at 1921-28; Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of
Shame Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L . 645, 673-85
(1997).
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Although such Kantian arguments for the privilege have
an undeniable appeal, they prove too much, because they undermine the legitimacy of all moral education by the state. If
the state's attempt to inspire moral judgment by relying on
authority or the threat of sanctions is indeed incompatible with
the defendant's autonomy, what is one to make of the penal
system's goal of rehabilitating the prisoner or deterring crime
through the threat of punishment? Both rehabilitation and
deterrence, by employing threats and rewards, also provide
merely contingent reasons for action. 117

111

See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1128-29 (advocacy of rehabilitation is incompatible with arguments that compelled self-incrimination impedes defendant's ability to arrive at independent moral judgment).
In fact, the Kantian has difficulty making sense of how moral education by
anyone is possible. Moral education, for example of children by their parents, must
make use of the educated's fears (most notably fear of punishment), loves (of one's
teacher or parents), the desire to imitate, and so on. Kantianism makes it a mystery how such influences could ever bring about the autonomous act of recognizing
the moral law. What passes for moral education seems to make the pupil do
something only for contingent reasons, but not because he recognizes that it is his
duty.
How is it then that one can educate someone to recognize unconditional duties? Presumably those who routinely do something for a contingent reason have a
tendency to internalize the goal until it becomes a commitment that persists even
when the contingent reason disappears. The preference for the act becomes
uncontingent, such that the individual will suffer a direct psychic cost from failing
to perform it. Although I may initially do what my parents say out of love or fear
of them, in the end their command becomes my own. This is shown by the fact
that I will stand by the command even if my parents say something different in
the future. If this process is possible with children, then it should be possible with
adults as well, including during compelled self-incrimination by the state.
Of those who seek to introduce norms into the economic analysis of the law,
Robert Cooter most emphasizes the role of internalization in the creation and
sustaining of norms. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 1643, 1661-68 (1996) (explaining the process of internalization of norm and
arguing that social norms can come into existence only when a sufficient number
of people internalize them sufficiently to bear the costs of enforcement); Robert D.
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 588-89 (1998)
(describing process of internalization); see also GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR
TASTES 225 (1996) (presenting an internalization theory of norms). In contrast,
others treat behavior in accordance with norms as heteronomous, in the sense that
some cost independent of the frustration of a direct desire to perform the action
required by the norm is what motivates compliance. See Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355-75
(1997) (norms may be costlessly enforced on others without internalization merely
by withholding the esteem of others that they desire).
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It is not surprising that Kantians have had difficulty explaining the moral role of the state. On the one hand, the content of the state's laws appears, to a great extent, to be informed by moral considerations. On the other hand, the very
means that the state uses to bring about enforcement of those
laws-punishment-appears incompatible with genuinely moral
motivation. 118 Because the state acts upon its citizens as heteronomous beings, its activities appear unrelated to citizens'
moral development. The state appears concerned, not with a
recognition of duty, but with arriving at a reconciliation of
citizens' de facto desires in a manner that will minimize
conflict. 119
111

Some have thought, however, that punishment of the "eye-for-an-eye" (lex
talionis) form, can inspire a recognition of unconditional obligation. For the view
that Kant thought that eye-for-an-eye punishments can morally educate because
they make concrete the rational principle of the categorical imperative, see Samuel
Fleischacker, Kant's Theory of Punishment, in ESSAYS ON KANT's POLITICAL PmLOSOPHY 191 (Howard Lloyd Williams ed., 1992). See also Jeremy Waldron, Lex
Talionis, 34 ARiz. L. REV. 25, 29 (1992). For contemporary arguments that lex
talionis can morally educate, see Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of
Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208 (1984); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming
Punishments Educate?, 65 U. Cm. L. REV. 733 (1998); and Waldron, supra.
m See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REAsON A316/B373 (Norman Kemp
Smith trans. 1965) (1787) (Legislation should be guided by the Idea of "a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by
which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others."). Such
a reading of Kant's political philosophy can be found, for example, in George P.
Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533 (1987).
For contrary views, see ALLEN D. RoSEN, KANT'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 82-114
(1993) (Kant's theory of justice concerns a subset of moral duties); Peter Benson,
External Freedom According to Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1987) (criticizing
Fletcher and arguing that Kant's concept of Right concerns the external embodiments of moral will in relationships between persons, for example, in contract);
J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneselr: Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 433 (1987) (arguing that view of external freedom as concerning
only subjective preferences cannot explain Kant's advocacy of outlawing victimless
crimes).
The contrast between the apparently utilitarian and positivist character of ·
Kant's political theory and his radically anti-utilitarian and anti-authoritarian
ethics appears to be a weakness in his thought, one often explained by the fact
that Kant's political theory was written in his dotage. But in an exemplary article,
Jeremy Waldron argues that the utilitarian and positivist aspects of Kant's political theory follow from the reasonable assumption that honest disagreement about
principles of justice will occur, requiring an external coercive authority to bring
about reconciliation and coordination. See Jeremy Waldron, Kant's Legal Positivism,
109 HARV. L. REv. 1535 (1996). Although Kant has his own theory of justice,
which he thinks follows from reason alone, there is no contradiction in his recognizing that honest disagreement about justice will nevertheless exist. The moral
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The tendency of the argument from autonomy to undermine the state's authority is represented by those writers, such
as Robert Paul Wolff and William Godwin, who have used
autonomy to argue for the anarchist position that there is no
duty to obey the law and that the state's coercive power is
illegitimate. 120 Thus, unless the privilege is an inconsistent
recognition by the state of its own lack of authority, one that if
consistent would apply to punishment and rehabilitation as
well, the argument from autonomy cannot provide a justification for the privilege.
3. Autonomy and Perso:r;1al Identity
Finally, one might argue that compelled self-incrimination
violates the personal identity of the criminal defendant. For
philosophers in the Kantian tradition, moral commitments are
closely associated with the self. Because desires are contingent
and fleeting, only a recognition of one's duty, which allows for
reflection upon one's changing desires, can provide the self
with a unifying project. 121 Accordingly, interference with
these commitments is a profound interference with the self.

duty to avoid war over principles of justice trumps even the duty to abide by
principles of justice.
Although this might seem an odd position given Kant's insistence on the
ability of duty to trump utilitarian considerations, for Kant, the absence of a univocal authority does not merely make the world a worse place, it undermines other
duties. For example, Kant thought that one does not have a duty to respect property rights if one was not assured that one's own property rights were going to be
respected in turn. Thus, the duty to make respecting rights possible requires that
one give up one's power to enforce the moral law to a univocal authority.
120
See RoBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARClllSM 18-19 (1970); WILLIAM
GoDWIN, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE (K. Codell Carter ed.,
abridged ed. 1971) (1793).
121
The association of personal identity with moral commitment has a long history. For example, Plato took contemplation of the good to be the product of an
eternal rational soul and identified acting on desire with losing oneself in the
world of chance and contingency.
One need not understand this relationship between morality and · personal
identity in cognitivist terms. Rather than understanding the unity to the self that
is provided by moral reflection in terms of a persistent cognitive self existing over
and above one's desires, the emotivist can understand it in terms of patterns of
affective concern that the individual has for aspects of himself. Rawls is an example of someone who holds a Kantian view of the unity of the self in terms of
moral commitments while naturalizing the patterns of concern by means of which
this unity comes into being. See RAWLS, supra note 112, at 563-54.
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The reeducation of a defendant who has a moral outlook contrary to that of the state would involve changing her identity
in a manner akin to murder. 122
I am sympathetic to these arguments. But, as we have
seen, one has good reason to be skeptical about whether criminal defendants have moral outlooks genuinely contrary to
those of the state. It is far more likely that the murderer or
rapist either has no commitments or has the commitments of
the general community but is insensitive to them. 123 If, by
morally reeducating, the state is building a self out of nothing,
or making the defendant aware of the self he always had, then
there is less reason to be worried about interference with his
personhood.
Furthermore, can such concern over personal identity
override all other considerations, most importantly the duty to
protect others against wrongs? Doesn't our belief in the appropriateness of rehabilitation show this to be false?124 Indeed,
doesn't the state attempt to influence the moral outlooks of all
its citizens through the threat of punishment?125
122

See Fortas, supra note 24, at 98 (privilege exemplifies view that "authority
[of the state] was not absolute: that it stopped short of the point where it might
invade [one's] mind and take dominion of his will"). Arguments that appear to
appeal to one's right to keep information about one's commitments private might
also be understood as appealing to one's right to keep one's commitments themselves free from intrusion:
Because of the significance of exclusive control over our own thought and
feelings, the privilege against self-incrimination can be seen to rest, ultimately, upon a concern that confessions never be coerced or required by
the state . . . . [T]he fundamental point is that required disclosure of
one's thoughts by itself diminishes the concept of individual personhood
within the society.
Richard A. Wasserstrom, Privacy: SoTM Arguments and Assumptions, in PHILOSOPIDCAL DIMENSIONS OF PRivACY 317, 322-23 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984);
see also Gerstein, supra note 6.
123
There is a tendency in the literature on the privilege to concentrate on those
cases in which the criminal defendant does have a clearly articulated contrary
moral vision. For example, Fortas speaks of the struggle against religious orthodoxy and McCarthyism in his justification of the privilege. See Fortas, supra note
24, at 98, 101-04.
124
See Dolinko, supra note 4, at 1128-29 (advocacy of rehabilitation is incompatible with arguments that compelled self-incrimination impedes defendant's ability to arrive at independent moral judgment).
125
One might argue, however, that the threat of punishment does not involve
the same invasion into one's personal identity as reeducation. When I change my
behavior to avoid criminal sanctions, the only desires that need be changed are
my instrumental desires. A desire that a state of affairs occur is instrumental if
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E. Conclusion
Traditional rights-based arguments for the privilege fail.
The most promising of these arguments, which appeal to the
autonomy of the criminal defendant, fail in the end because
they threaten the legitimacy of the state. Although the moral
psychology presupposed by such arguments has some plausibility, its consequences appear anarchistic. It is now safe to say
that the only remaining arguments with any promise are those
that have been ignored or dismissed in the literature: the cruel
trilemma argument and the argument from the adversarial
nature of our system of criminal justice.
IV. THE PRiviLEGE AND SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

If an argument for the privilege on the basis of our preference for an adversarial system of justice is to amount to more
than circular arguments for the privilege on the basis of our
preference for the privilege, an adversarial system will have to
be justified in terms of principles or policies that have merit in
their own right. A promising possibility is the individualist and

that state is desired because of its tendency to bring about other states of affairs
that one desires. For example, I desire to brush my teeth instrumentally, because
I desire tooth-brushing only because of its tendency to bring about other states of
affairs (for example, social acceptance) that I desire. A desire is non-instrumental
if it is desired independently of its tendency to bring about other states of affairs
one might desire. Although I might have moral commitments that lead me to noninstrumentally desire to kill, if I find that killing is criminally sanctioned I may
nevertheless instrumentally desire not to kill. One's instrumental desires and so
one's behavior will change due to the threat of criminal sanctions, but one's underlying motivation make-up-one's selfhood-remains the same. Thus a state that
attempted merely to deter conduct would not violate the personhood of its citizens.
But it is difficult to envisage a state that sought merely to alter behavior
without influencing the underlying commitments of its citizens, if only because it
would be too costly to secure compliance with the law through changes in instrumental desires alone. A state would find the desire to engage in affective engineering as a means of ensuring more stable compliance overwhelming. Furthermore, it is almost impossible for criminal prohibitions not to have an effect on
underlying commitments, either indirectly, through the tendency of instrumental
desires to become non-instrumental, see supra note 117, or more directly, through
their symbolic or expressive effect. And the state intends that they do so. The
argument from personal identity succeeds only at the cost of threatening the
state's authority.
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contractarian principles common in the Anglo-American political tradition.
Understanding the adversarial system of justice in terms
of contractarianism is plausible for two reasons. First, there
appears to be a correlation between the adversarial nature of a
country's criminal justice system and the level of
contractarianism in its political traditions. 126 Anglo-American
criminal procedure is more adversarial than criminal procedure on the European Continent,127 and Anglo-American political traditions are more contractarian than Continental traditions.128 Second, contractarianism seems a promising way
to explain why a criminal defendant may have the moral right
to take an adversarial stance toward the state. If, as
contractarians claim, citizens have no natural duties to the
state, they might also have the right to refuse to participate in
criminal investigations of themselves.
A relationship between a duty to testify against oneself
and natural duties to the state is apparent in John Griffiths'
article, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of
the Criminal Process. 129 Griffiths offers what he calls a "Fam-

121

See generally MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 8-15, 71-180 (1986).
127
In fact, there is a privilege against self-incrimination throughout western
continental Europe, in the sense that a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to
speak (usually even during pretrial investigations). See Mirjan Dama.Ska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative
Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. ~06, 526-27 (1973); Gordon Van Kessel, European Per·
spective on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REv.
799, 804-08 (1998). But the criminal defendant remains a primary source of evidence against him, see Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American
Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 423 (1992), for a number of reasons:
1) The criminal defendant is required to take the stand and must assert
the privilege in response to questions by the judge. Thus the pressure to
speak is much greater under continental systems. See Dama.Ska, supra, at
527-28; Van Kessel, supra, at 833-35.
2) The criminal defendant can be brought before the court before the
prosecution has established a prima facie case, and so is at a disadvantage in determining whether he should exercise the privilege because he
will make the choice in ignorance of the prosecution's case. See Dama.Ska,
supra, at 528-30.
3) Protections against adverse inferences from silence are anemic. See
Van Kessel, supra, at 821-23.
128
See DAMASKA, supra note 126; see also infra Conclusion.
129
See John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third '"Model" of the
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
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ily Model"130 of criminal procedure and contrasts it with the
"Battle Model" that he believes has dominated past discussions
of criminal procedure. 131 The Battle Model relies upon "the
conception of the criminal as a special kind of person who is
the 'enemy' of society, and of the trial as a battle in which (if
guilty) he is vanquished."132 Under the Family Model, neither
the state nor the criminal defendant may dissolve their duties
to the other; the relationship between citizen and state is
nonconsensual. While the state has a duty to rehabilitate the
defendant and reintegrate him into the political community,
the defendant has a duty to participate in this reintegration by
testifying against himself. 133
A number of writers have indicated that the privilege
might have its source in contractarianism. 134 In an article
published in 1954 in the Cleveland Bar Association Journal,
Abe Fortas briefly suggested that the privilege
was a part of the seventeenth century's compact theory of government which a little later received its classic expression by John
Locke ... . The state was merely an instrument created by contract
in which rulers and the ruled were parties on equal terms; and the
state's authority was limited by the terms of the compact.135

Fortas claimed that it follows from such views that
[The individual has] the sovereign right to refuse to cooperate; to
meet the state on terms as equal as their respective strength would
permit; and to defend himself by all means within his power-including the instrument of silence.
. . . A sovereign state has the right to defend itself, and within
the limits of accepted procedure, to punish infractions of the rules

130

Id. at 371-73.
Id. at 367-71.
132
Id. at 379.
133
Characteristically, Griffiths argues that the reintroduction of the privilege
into juvenile justice proceedings, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42-55 (1967) (Fortas,
J.), was the result of an unjustified reliance on the Battle Model. See Griffiths,
supra note 129, at 399-404. In a family, there is no privilege against self-incrimination.
134
Some writers who have suggested a relationship between the privilege and
contractarianism are David Luban and Robert Heidt. See LUBAN, supra note 25, at
194-97; Heidt, supra note 24, at 468.
135
Fortas, supra note 24, at 98.
131
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that govern its relationships with its sovereign individuals. But it
has no right to compel the sovereign individual to surrender or impair his right of self-defense.136

But if the state may defend itself, why can it not do so by putting to bear on the defendant inducements to testify? Simply
appealing to the defendant's right of self-defense, even if such
a right exists, is not enough. The defendant might defend
himself by escaping from state custody if he could. But the
state, exercising its own right of self-defense, will ·hot allow
it. Why should the defendant's attempts to be silent be treated
any differently?
Fortas appears to appeal to the fact that a defendant always has the ability to defy the state through silence as a
justification for the privilege. This argument, however, which
is similar to the argument from impossibility/37 is not persuasive. Certainly the state cannot do anything about someone
who intransigently refuses to speak. But it is quite another
thing for the state to make such silence easy by refusing to
sanction it. The question remains why the state should make
silence costless.
A. Damaska's Paradox

Although Fortas is surely right that there is some connection between the privilege and contractarianism, he, like most
who suggest this relationship, fails to spell out in detail the
connection between the two. One exception is Mhjan Damaska,
who, in his Two Faces of Justice and State Authority, attempts
to give a systematic explanation of the relationship between
the common law adversarial system of justice and individualistic political principles commonly held in common law countries.
With respect to the organization of the judiciary, Damaska
argues that common law countries generally take a coordinate
approach. Whereas judges in Continental countries are clearly
professional civil servants having a place within an administrative heirarchy, common law adjudicators exercise greater
autonomy. 138 What is more important for the privilege, with

136
137
138

Fortas, supra note 24, at 98-99.
See supra Part III.A.
See DAMASKA, supra note 126, at 16-70.
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respect to the purposes of adjudication, common law systems
see adjudication as a form of dispute resolution. This approach
depends upon a reactive theory of the state, in which the state
exists solely to mediate conflict between individuals, rather
than playing a role as a promoter of a particular conception of
the good. The activist state, in contrast, views adjudication as
the implementation of state policies that help realize its conception of the good life.139
Indeed, Damaska argues that in a reactive state the law
itself is conceived of as mediating between individuals in
conflict, because it brings into effect actual or hypothetical
contracts between the citizens of a state. 140 Once again, this
approach can be contrasted with that of the activist state,
under which law "springs from the state and expresses its
policies."141
Under the reactive theory, adjudication is a form of dispute resolution even when an individual and the state come
into conflict in criminal proceedings and the state plays the
dual role of combatant and adjudicator. 142 In contrast, the
inquisitorial system sees no parity between the interests of the
state and the criminal defendant. The conflict between the
two is not one in need of resolution within a neutral forum.
Rather the forum is the means by which the state implements
its goals concerning the population as a whole: "The state
interest is lexically superior, indeed supreme, rather than
on the same plane with individual interests wherein the two
could be 'balanced.'"143
Damaska then argues that a conflict-resolving proceeding
requires that each party have control over his activities in the
suit:
[T]he reactive state, reluctant to embrace any philosophy of the good
life, allows individuals to be sovereign in the management of their

139

See id. at 73 {"The task of the reactive state is limited to providing a supporting framework within which its citizens pursue their chosen goals. Its instruments must set free spontaneous forces of social self-management.").
uo See id. at 76 ("The only legitimate role the law can take is to try to determine how citizens would have agreed to resolve a matter had they anticipated
it . . . . Accordingly, even state law is affected by the imagery; and hermeneutic of
agreement, albeit in a somewhat subterranean fashion.").
141
Id. at 82.
uz See id. at 78.
143
DAMA.SKA, supra note 126, at 86.
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own concerns. Transposed to the administration of justice, this sovereignty requires that a party be recognized as the master of his
lawsuit (dominis litis), entitled to conduct it as he pleases ....1"

This right to control one's role in litigation in the reactive state
expresses itself in the privilege against self-incrimination. 145
On the other hand, "[b]ecause the activist state expects all to
participate in common endeavors, it also requires citizens to
cooperate with authorities in the administration of justice."146
Damaska's argument for the privilege seems to be that,
because the interests of the defendant and the interests of the
state are in some sense morally equivalent, each party is
given freedom to express these interests in a neutral forum
during litigation. If the state could compel the criminal defendant to be an informational resource, the proceedings would
not be neutral-instead the state's interests would be represented as superior.
Does this explanation of the privilege work?147 There is
a tension in Damaska's argument between the reactive state's
view that the law is the result of binding agreements between
individuals, each of whom possesses interests of equivalent
moral weight, and its view that the interests of the criminal defendant and the state during trial are in some sense
morally equivalent. The problem is that giving the criminal
defendant freedom to pursue his interests during trial might
be contrary to promises he made when the law was brought
into being.148
1
"
145

144
147

Id. at 104.
See id. at 126.
Id. at 164.

One problem is that the absence of a privilege in civil cases does not appear
plausible under Damaaka's account. If anything the conflict-resolving approach to
procedure should be stronger in civil than in criminal proceedings. After all, in a
criminal case the purity of conflict is muddled by the fact that the state is both
participant and adjudicator. But Damaaka admits that procedure in both common
law and Continental countries is rarely purely conflict-resolving or policy-implementing. Indeed, he notes that Continental civil procedure, by providing civil litigants with greater protection against compelled testimony, is closer to the conflictresolving paradigm than common-law civil procedure. See id. at 127-28, 209-10.
ua Another problem is that, since the social contract, at least of the Lockean
form, takes place within a realm of natural rights and duties, the interests of the
criminal defendant and the interests of the state may not be on the same moral
plane even before the criminal defendant has entered into the social contract. The
criminal defendant cannot set up his interests as a murderer against the interests
of the state as vindicator of the murdered, even if the state lacks the monopoly
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Consider, for example, a social contract under which each
citizen, in the interest of mutual security, promises to testify
truthfully and gives the state the power to compel truthful
testimony if he becomes a criminal defendant. It is very probable that individuals entering into the social contract would
agree to such restrictions on their behavior.149 Allowing a
criminal defendant to escape these obligations during trial in
order to ensure that his interests and those of the state are
treated as morally equivalent would appear to undermine
rather than give effect to the theory that his relationship with
the state is contractual.
This point becomes even clearer when -one considers interests of the criminal defendant during trial that are not respected by the state. Consider, for example, the defendant's interest
in escaping detention or violating the rules of evidence by
introducing prejudicial facts concerning the prosecutor's private life. Why isn't the defendant allowed to satisfy these interests as well? Presumably the reason the reactive state would
give is that the defendant, when entering into the social contract, gave up these strategic interests because if each defendant were allowed to pursue them, the enforcement of the
criminal law would be frustrated. It was reasonable for him to
give them up, because adequate enforcement of the criminal
law is something that everyone, including the defendant himself, benefits from. Furthermore, he had no reason to reserve
these interests in order to protect some important value that
might trump the value of the efficient enforcement of the law,
the way the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures might be reserved by one entering into
the social contract because it protects the right of privacy.
The interest the defendant has in remaining silent at trial
seems no different from his interest in bringing up the
prosecutor's sex life. Both seem to be merely strategic interests in avoiding conviction. If so, why respect one and frustrate
the other?
This is not to say that Damaska has not identified an
important part of the ideology of criminal procedure in com-

powers that it would have had the criminal defendant entered into the social
contract.
149
See infra Part IV.C.4.
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mon-law countries. He is quite right that these countries treat
some strategic interests of the criminal defendant during trial
as, in some sense, of equivalent moral worth to the state's
interest in accurately adjudicating and punishing violations of
the law. But rather than flowing obviously from a
contractarian theory of the state, this approach to criminal
procedure appears to be in conflict with contractarianism,
because it appears able to release the criminal defendant from
obligations to the state that would have been created under
the social contract.
Indeed, the adversarial system of criminal procedure appears deeply paradoxical. On the one hand, that state's engaging in criminal investigation, prosecution, and punishment
appears to rest on the state's authority over the defendant.
Yet in many respects the strategic interests of the defendant
during trial are treated as having equivalent moral weight to
the state's interests, indicating that neither has authority over
the other. 150
More is needed, therefore, to show that the privilege follows from social contract theory. The most promising argument
is that one cannot make a binding· promise to the sovereign
that gives it the right to coerce testimony should one become a
criminal defendant. Something like this argument appears in
Hobbes's Leviathan.

B. Hobbes's Argument for the Privilege
In Leviathan, Hobbes argued: "If a man be interrogated by
the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a crime done by
150

It is perhaps because of this tension in Dama8ka's account that he finds it
necessary to reinforce his explanation of the privilege with other arguments not
obviously related to contractarianism. He goes on to say the following:
But even more serious is the subversion of the requirement that each
contestant prove his own claims and sustain his own evidentiary burden.
It is a curious burden indeed that can be sustained by one side's forcing
the opponent to carry the load. As Roman-canon legal scholars liked to
say, a party to a contest should not be compelled to become telum
adversarii sui, that is, an offensive weapon of his adversary.
DAMASKA, supra note 126, at 126. Dama8ka ends up suggesting that the privilege
has its source in the presumption of innocence, an argument that has already
been rejected above, see supra Part II.E., and in a right not to be made telum
adversarii sui-an argument that I will argue below is dependent upon the morality of warfare. See infra Part V.
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himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to
confesse it; because no man ... can be obligated by Covenant
to accuse himselfe. "151 Such promises are not binding, it
seems, because one will receive no benefit from abiding by the
promise at the time of performance: "A man cannot lay down
the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take
away his life; because he cannot be understood to aim thereby,
at any Good to himselfe."152 Faced with certain punishment if
one confesses, taking one's chances by refusing to confess will
always seem the lesser of two evils:
For though a man may Covenant thus, Unlesse I do so, or so, kill
me; he cannot Covenant thus, Unlesse I do so, or so, I will not resist
you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseth the
lesser evill, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the
greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And
this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead Criminals to
Execution, and Prison, with armed men, not withstanding that
Criminals have consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.153

A number of courts have pointed to this argument in Hobbes
as a potential defense of the privilege. 154
1. Impossibility
It is not clear how to interpret this argument. One possible
interpretation is that Hobbes is offering the argument from
impossibility. 155 Because no one could be expected to abide by
a duty to confess, we should be excused from performance. If
this is Hobbes's argument, criticisms of the impossibility argument discussed above should apply here too. 156 By punishing
silent or perjurious defendants, the sovereign can make confession a psychological possibility for the defendant. The argu-

151

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 269 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968) (1651); see
also id. at 199.
152
Id. at 192.
153
Id. at 99.
1
~ See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 180 (1961) (Douglas J., dissenting); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772
F.2d 1410, 1418 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring).
155
Cf. supra Part lli.A This is the interpretation offered in R.E. EWIN, VIRTUES
AND RIGHTS: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES 81-83 (1991).
156
See supra Part III.A.
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ment from impossibility appears to have prima facie plausibility only in cases in which those who confess are put to
death-something that is rare precisely because no incentive to
confess is thereby created. But even without such incentives,
confession is not psychologically impossible. Many criminals
repent. Furthermore, even if it were psychologically impossible,
we often require someone to discharge duties that we admit we
would not be able to discharge were we in his shoes, particularly if the duties exist as a result of something, like the commission of a crime, that he could have avoided and ind~ed had
the duty to avoid. 157
2. Contract Interpretation _
Another interpretation of Hobbes's argument looks not to
the impossibility of performance but to one's probable motivations when entering the social contract to interpret the extent
of the promisor's duty to the state. That is, no one with selfinterested motivations would rationally enter into a contract
that created a duty to confess. Because a person enters the
social contract in the interest of self-preservation, the promises
he makes could not involve duties to help bring about his own
death or the loss of his liberty.158 To make such a promise is
a conclusive sign that one's promise was not voluntary or that
one was insane.159
This argument also fails. Just because one enters a contract with the belief that it will be in one's interest does not
mean that his contractual obligations can never end up being
to his disadvantage. The fact that someone will lose money on
a contract does not make his contractual obligations void. To
explain why one would have bound himself by contractual
obligations that end up to his disadvantage, all one has to do is
explain why binding himself in such a manner might have
been to his advantage ex ante. It is entirely plausible that, in

157

See id.
See EWIN, supra note 155, at 78-81; Richard A Posner, Excessive Sanctions
for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 642
(1982); Richard Dien Winfield, Rethinking the Legal Process, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 153,
158

161 (1994).
15
' See A JOHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: LOCKE, CONSENT, AND
THE LIMITS OF SOCIETY 137 n .83 (1993).
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the interest of self-preservation, all citizens would promise not
merely to abide by the law but to relinquish their right of selfpreservation if they violated the law. The duty to confess and
submit to punishment, by furthering the enforcement of the
criminal law, might make everyone more secure.160
3. Duties and Rational Self-Interest
But it is not clear that Hobbes's argument is about moral
duties or rights, as these are normally understood, at all. For
example, Hobbes considered all the promises in the social contract to be invalid without a means of enforcement. 161 Our
usual understanding of the duties created by a promise is that
they are binding even in the absence of a method of enforcement. Enforcement is relevant only to whether it is in one's interest to abide by one's duties. Accordingly it may be that
Hobbes was concerned, not with moral obligation, but with
individuals' rational self-interest.162 Rather than speaking of
moral duties arising from a social contract, Hobbes was really
speaking of external constraints on our choices that we willingly bring into being as a means of avoiding the conflict and
uncertainty of the state of nature.
If so, Hobbes's claim that one cannot alienate one's right to
self-defense, and so cannot promise to confess, might mean
only that one threatened with punishment by the state no
longer has a rationally self-interested reason to submit to the
sovereign. But even if that is true, there is no reason to believe
that he has no duty to cooperate as a result of prior promises
or indeed as a natural duty.
4. Hohfeldian Privileges, Moral and Legal
Even if Hobbes had shown that we cannot create a duty to
the sovereign to confess our crimes to him, this would nevertheless only go so far as to give the criminal defendant a
160

See Posner, supra note 158.
See HOBBES, supra note 151, at 196.
162
This is a matter of considerable debate among Hobbes scholars. For the view
that Hobbes's "laws of nature" are ultimately derivable from considerations of what
will be conducive to self-preservation, see GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY 349-68 (1986).
161
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Hohfeldian 163 privilege against self-incrimination. Refusal to
self-incriminate would not violate the rights of others. But it
would require more to give the defendant a right against the
sovereign to noninterference in the exercise of his privilege. A
further argument is needed that the sovereign has promised or
otherwise has a duty not to compel self-incrimination. It appears that the most Hobbes could ever show is that the defendant and the sovereign are at war with one another, and that
either side may use whatever means are at his disposal to
prevail without violating the rights of the other. As we have
seen, Hobbes thought it followed from the inalienability of the
privilege of self-defense that one also had the privilege to resist
arrest. But that did not mean the sovereign had no privilege to
punish resisting arrest. 164 Indeed, Hobbes thought the sovereign had no duties-it could not be accused of injustice even for
putting the innocent to death. 165
The distinction between a Hohfeldian privilege and what
we can call a claim, that is, a privilege combined with a right
against interference with one's privilege, is useful outside of
Hobbes exegesis. Perhaps those who favor the privilege are
confusing Hohfeldian privileges and claims. Assume that the
defendant has a Hohfeldian privilege against self-incrimination, in the sense that he will have violated no duty to others
in refusing to testify. This feeling can easily be confused with
the idea that the state has a duty not to interfere in the
defendant's exercising his privilege. This is because in most
areas the law seeks to reduce conflict by assigning privileges in
conjunction with rights against interference. For example,
property rights include privileges of use and rights to exclude
others from use. But it is not true that Hohfeldian privileges
never exist without rights against interference. Particularly in
areas of economic competition, bare privileges may be all there
~'3

See WESLEY HOHFELD, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPI'IONS 39 (1919) (privilege is "mere negation of a duty . . . having a content or tenor precisely opposite
to that of the privilege in question").
1
" See SIMMONS, supra note 159, at 152 & n.16.
1
" See HOBBES, supra note 151, at 264-66. This is a further reason to question
whether· Hobbes actually offered an impossibility argument for the privilege. For
the impossibility argument would work only if the sovereign had a duty not to
enforce commands with which individuals were psychologically unlikely to comply.
But since Hobbes saw the sovereign as having no duties at all, there is no reason
to think that he would impose this duty on the sovereign.
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is. For example, a company's privilege to use non-union labor
may coexist with a union's privilege to organize.166 To say
that two individuals have Hohfeldian privileges that conflict is
legally meaningful, since the legal consequence of these privileges is that if either sues for protection in the exercise of his
privilege, he would lose.167
The tendency to confuse privileges and claims is particularly strong when one is speaking of a relationship between
the individual and the state. Indeed, if the state's interference
with an individual's privilege can include making the privileged act illegal, then no legally (as opposed to a morally)
meaningful Hohfeldian privilege is possible. The individual's
bare privilege can no longer express itself legally in the fact
that the state would lose if it attempted to bring legal methods
to bear against the privileged individual. The state, in exercising its privilege, may declare the defendant's privileged act
illegal. The defendant can possess only a moral privilege
against the state under such circumstances.
Still, in the moral realm the assignment of such a
Hohfeldian privilege against the state can be meaningful. In
areas that are intrinsically combative, for example, in warfare,
it is not meaningless to say that someone has a privilege
against a state without a right against non-interference. A
combatant might have the privilege to struggle against a state
without having the right to do so unimpeded. And criminal
procedure might be another area where such moral privileges
against the state exist.
As we shall see, it is possible that the attempt to find legal
expression for the defendant's purely moral Hohfeldian privilege not to self-incriminate is the source of many people's intuitions in favor of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.168 However, we have yet to find an argument
that the criminal defendant has even a Hohfeldian privilege
against self-incrimination, much less a right against interference in the exercise of this privilege. 169
166

See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 988-90.
167
See id. at 990-92.
168
See infra Part IV.C.7.
169
From now on, in order to distinguish the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination from a Hohfeldian privilege that would carry with it no right
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C. Lockean Social Contract Theory
Because it normatively limits the state's powers according
to the consent of the governed, Lockean social contract theory
is a better candidate for justifying a right of silence. Furthermore, it is more likely that Lockean theory stands behind such
a right, since it is Locke, not Hobbes, who was the primary
source of the prevailing Anglo-American contractarian theory
of the state. 170 But, as we have seen, Lockean social contract
theory appears unable to justify a right of silence, because one
entering the social contract would willingly give to the state
the power to compel truthful testimony.
Nevertheless, a principled argument for a right of silence
can be drawn from the Lockean tradition. It is not, however, a
direct justification of such a right. A contractarian state would
recognize that the criminal defendant who challenged its authority and asserted his innocence has a Hohfeldian privilege
to struggle against it. This privilege is insufficient to argue directly for a legal right to remain silent. However, the Lockean
state might provide the defendant with a right of silence for
expressive reasons-in order to give concrete legal meaning to
what otherwise would be a merely extra-legal privilege toresist the state.
My argument for this expressive justification of the privilege will proceed as follows. After outlining Locke's account of
the state of nature and the social contract,171 I explore whether those in the state of nature who are being investigated and
adjudicated for rights violations might have a Hohfeldian privilege to remain silent that would be recognized by their adjudicators. I will argue that because an innocent criminal defendant in the state of nature would have a right to refuse to
testify, adjudicators would recognize that the criminal defendant who took himself to be innocent would have a !Johfeldian
privilege to struggle against them by remaining silent.172
But someone entering civil society would give up the right
to struggle against the state if he was innocent. Therefore, the
against the state to non-interference, I will call the Fifth Amendment privilege a
right of silence.
110
See infra Conclusion.
171
See infra Parts IV.C.1. and IV.C.2.
112
See infra Part IV.C.3.
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state, it seems, would not recognize that he had even a
Hohfeldian privilege to enter into conflict with it. 173 For an
expressive justification to work, the state must allow the criminal defendant to escape the social contract sufficiently for him
to engage in subjectively legitimate conflict, but not so much
that the state ceases to see itself as legitimate. We must justify precisely that paradoxical relationship between criminal
defendant and state that we saw in Damaska's account of the
adversary system.
There are indeed some good arguments that all of us, not
merely criminal defendants, have always been in the state of
nature with respect to the state. 174 These arguments tend to
undermine any possibility of the state having authority, however, and are therefore unlikely to be recognized by the state.
But a contractarian state would recognize that a citizen always
retains sovereign rights of resistance against a state whose
actions exceed the scope of the citizen's consent. Although the
retention of these rights of resistance might appear to eviscerate the social contract, I argue that such a position misinterprets the role of the social contract in bringing about social
stability.175 Thus, even a Lockean state that took itself to be
legitimate would recognize that a criminal defendant could
have a Hohfeldian privilege to struggle against it by remaining
silent. I then explain the expressive justification for the right
of silence in terms of this Hohfeldian privilege. 176
1. The Lockean State of Nature
For Locke, unlike for Hobbes, individuals do not have
complete freedom to act as they see fit in the state of nature.
Rather, each person has a natural duty not "to harm another
in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."177 In addition, individuals in the state of nature have the natural executive privilege "to punish transgressors of [the natural] law to such a
degree as may hinder its violation."178
173
174
176
176
177
178

See infra Part IV.C.4.
See infra Part IV.C.5.
See infra Part IV.C.6.
See infra Part IV.C.7.
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 6.
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 7. This is not a right to punish, because others may
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If people were accurate judges of rights-violations, the
existence of this natUral axecutive privilege would be
unproblematic. But because people are often not accurate, the
state of nature can devolve into an unending state of war. An
individual who perceives his rights to have been violated will
seek to exercise his natural privilege to punish, creating what
the punished party perceives to be a rights-violation allowing
him to punish.179 Because there is no authority to resolve the
dispute, an unending state of war will likely result.180
Locke provides each person in the state of nature with
something like a Hohfeldian privilege to act upon his fallible
perceptions concerning violations of natural rights when deciding whether to punish. 181 Indeed, without such a privilege,
one would never be allowed to engage in punishment at all,
since actual rights-violations can always diverge from what one
thinks are rights-violations. As a result, Locke's state of nature

engage in competitive interference. Someone else may preempt my privilege to
punish by exercising his privilege first. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LoCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 154-56 (1992). Others may not engage in other forms of interference, however, for example, by erecting barriers to my punishing.
m It appears that for Locke the executive privilege in the state of nature is
one to punish only actual, not perceived, rights violations: "lnf he that judges,
judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of
mankind." LoCKE, supra note 1, § 13. Erroneous punishments are violations of
natural law even if they were reasonable at the time that they were made. See
SIMMONS, supra note 178, at 145. Locke speaks of the privilege to punish that
exists in the state of nature in an epistemically unforgiving form. Whether one
has actually punished a rights violator or, by punishing, has himself violated a
right is an issue that can be answered only by God. See LOCKE, supra note 1,
§ 21. This is not to say that there are no natural epistemic or procedural duties
to use due care when judging and punishing rights-violations. It may be that one
violates natural rights when one punishes unreasonably, even if the person one
punishes is guilty. But punishing reasonably does not protect one from having
violated natural rights.
The fact that reasonable punishment can still be a rights violation helps the
state of nature descend into a state of war. If erroneous but reasonable punishments were not rights violations, then fewer punishments would merit-and would
be perceived as meriting-retaliation. Only disagreements about whether a punishment was reasonable should lead to feuding. It is probable, however, that the
number of disagreements concerning the reasonableness of punishment would be
sufficient to allow the state of nature to descend into a state of war.
110
See LoCKE, supra note 1, § 20.
111
Once again, there may be natural epistemic or procedural duties to use due
care when judging and punishing rights-violations. But in the end the punisher
must have a subjective Hohfeldian privilege to act on his fallible perception that
these duties have been satisfied.
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is, in the end, much like Hobbes's, in the sense that people
within it have privileges to enter into conflict. But it differs
from Hobbes's in two respects. First, these subjective privileges
to battle are overlaid with objective natural rights and duties,
even if these objective rights and duties are able to influence
action only through perceptions of their existence. Just because
I have a subjective privilege to do something does not mean I
am not violating objective rights by doing so. Second, because
such objective rights and duties exist, and people know they
do, people attempt to act, albeit fallibly, in accordance with
them. As a result, conflict is less likely to occur in the Lockean
state of nature than in the Hobbesian, where people have
broader privileges to act in accordance with their self-interest.
What does it mean for someone not to have this subjective
Hohfeldian privilege to enter into conflict? The best example is
someone, like one's young child, who has a natural duty to
submit to one's authority. The young child cannot legitimately
set up his own moral judgment against our own and so cannot
enter into legitimate conflict with us.
Another example is the radically evil person who aggresses
against us, not because he is a misguided moralist retaliating
for what he thinks is a rights violation, but because he simply
likes harming us. This person would have no subjective
Hohfeldian privilege to aggress against us. It is true that we
struggle against the radically evil in pretty much the same
way that we struggle against the misguided moralist. Furthermore, we will say to each that if he would simply recognize
natural rights, he would stop fighting with us. But we accept
that, in some sense, natural rights themselves are responsible
for our conflict with the moralist, because they failed to make
themselves apparent to someone who attempted to abide by
them. It is the problem of the misguided moralist that makes
the social contract necessary. In contrast, the epistemic limits
of natural rights are not responsible for our conflict with the
radically evil. Natural rights alone are sufficient to deal with
him. Because we see no route to his conflict with us that is
compatible with an appreciation of natural rights, we are likely
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to treat him differently from other combatants, for example, by
denying him the (albeit limited) respect that we generally
accord to those with whom we feud. 182
2. The Social Contract and the Absence of a Natural Duty
to Join the State
Locke understands there to be two steps in the creation of
the authority of the state. The first is the creation of a political
community under which each member surrenders his privilege
to punish to the majority. 183 The second is the creation of a
government which is entrusted to carry out the will of the
political communityl84 and to exercise discretionary authority
as long as its actions are in the interest of the community.185
The first has been called the popular social contract and the
second the rectoral social contract.186
Under the popular social contract, the citizen has a duty to
refrain from private retribution against those who have
wronged him. He has a duty to submit to the majority's decisions concerning rights violations, even if he thinks these decisions are wrong. He therefore gives . up even his subjective
privilege to enter into conflict with others.
The creation of a political community can put an end to
feuding. For Locke, however, this fact does not put upon one a
natural duty to enter into civil society. Although the existence
of an authority with a monopoly on the adjudication and punishment of rights violations benefits everyone (or almost everyone), the state's monopoly exists only because of the consent
of the governed and is limited by the extent of that consent. I
cannot be forced to give up this private right to the state. This
absence of a natural duty to enter into the state is foundational to Locke's contractarian approach. 187 The state's exclusive
1112

Many questions remain, however. Just how far does this subjective
Hohfeldian privilege to act on the basis of one's moral perceptions extend? What if
someone harms us on the basis of the moral view that harming others is good?
Or do subjective Hohfeldian privileges apply only to those who have largely correct
moral views but have misapplied them due to empirical errors?
183
See LocKE, supra note 1, §§ 94-99.
1
~ See LoCKE, supra note 1, §§ 136, 211, 221-22.
185
•
See LoCKE, supra note 1, §§ 159-168.
186
See EDMUND MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RisE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 109 (1988).
117
See JOHN HODSON, THE ETHICS OF LEGAL COERCION 117 (1983); LoCKE,
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right to adjudicate and punish rights violations is artificial,
created by the consent of its citizens.
On the other hand, Locke takes the promise to enter civil
society to be irrevocable and absolute. A citizen is "perpetually
and indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a
subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state
of nature."188 But tacit consent to join a political community,
by "possession, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of
· any government," obliges one to "obedience to the laws of that
government, during such enjoyment"189 only and leaves that
person with the right to withdraw subsequently from the political community.190
3. A Right of Silence in the State of Nature
Assume that the criminal defendant and the adjudicator of
guilt are in the state of nature with respect to each other. I
will, following Robert Nozick, call such a criminal defendant an
independent. 191 Could an independent legitimately assert a
right not to testify during trial? Despite the fact that Locke
sees the problems of private enforcement of justice within the
state of nature to be the motivation for entering civil society,
he gives little in the way of details concerning what procedures
for the enforcement of justice are allowable in the state of
nature. Indeed, as Nozick has noted, "[t]he notions of procedural rights, public demonstration of guilt, and the like, have a
very unclear status within state-of-nature theory. "192
Let us distinguish between two burdens on the independent during trial. The first is his exposure to the risk of punishment as a result of the adjudicative procedures used at
trial. The second is the burden of his participation in trial,
which might include the burden of compelled testimony.
We already know that the innocent independent has a
right not to suffer punishment and has a right to struggle and

supra note 1, § 122; SIMMONS, supra note 178, at 123-24, 163 n.77.
188
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 121; see also LoCKE, supra note 1, § 243.
189
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 119.
190
LOCKE, supra note 1, §§ 121-122.
191
See RoBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 96 (1974).
192
ld. at 96.
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retaliate against the punisher.193 It also should be clear that
the guilty independent has a duty to submit to punishment. It
may be that in a Hobbesian state of nature the guilty can set
up his self-interest against those who seek to punish him. But
insofar as the Lockean approach assumes that relations in the
state of nature are imbued with natural rights and duties, the
guilty independent has no such privilege.194
The question remains, however, what level of risk of improper punishment the innocent independent may be subjected
to during trial. Nozick himself argues that natural rights concerning proper adjudicative procedures can be derived from
more general natural rights against being subjected to excessive or unreasonable risks. Because individuals have duties not
to engage in excessively risky activities, the executive privilege
to punish rights violations that individuals have in the state of
nature is limited by a duty to use reliable procedures. 195 Thus
1113

This is true even if it was the result of reasonable procedures.
The only exception might be in extreme cases of impossibility, for example
the prisoner being taken to the gallows who struggles against his captors.
195
See NOZICK, supra note 191, at 102. The existence of this procedural limitation is crucial to Nozick's justification of the state's monopoly on law enforcement.
Because of the costs of private enforcement of justice and the benefits from economies or" scale, a dominant protective association ("DPA"), to which the substantial
m~ority of individuals have surrendered their executive privileges, is likely to
arise. This DPA, like any individual in the state of nature, may prevent the application of procedures that are excessively risky, since the application of these procedures is itself a violation of natural rights. See id. at 108-10. Although the DPA
does not have a right to exclusive punishment, its dominance will mean that it
has the actual final word on whether procedures used by "independents"-those
who have refused to assign their right to adjudicate and punish rights violations
to the DPA-are acceptable. See id. at 54. This final word is a de facto monopoly
on adjudication. And because the DPA is validly exercising the executive privileges
delegated to it by its subscribers, it is not violating anyone's rights. Because this
process occurs without violating anyone's rights, it provides a justification for the
state's de facto monopoly on enforcement. See id. at 52, 118-19.
It would appear, however, that Nozick has shown only how the state can prohibit independents from using unreliable methods, not why it can control all private enforcement of justice by independents. See SIMMONS, supra note 159, at 164
n.78. One might also wonder why the existence of procedural rights and duties are
not sufficient on their own to create a natural duty to enter into the state, thus
rendering Nozick's invisible hand explanation of the state's legitimate authority
superfluous. If the state is a more effective enforcer of rights-violations, then a
natural procedural duty to effectively and fairly enforce rights might require one
to cede one's right of enforcement to the state. David Schmidtz has argued, for
example, that, since one has a right to punish only by the least risky acceptable
method, those remaining in the state of nature have to let the state punish for
them. See DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GoVERNMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE PuB1
"
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an innocent independent has a right not to be submitted to
procedures that create an unreasonable risk of improper punishment and has the right to struggle and retaliate against
such unreasonable risk-imposition. 196
Nozick's conclusion is odd. Why does the innocent independent have a duty to accept any risk of improper punishment,
particularly since, if he is found guilty, he is unlikely to ever
be compensated for the error? 197 A system of rights enforcement in which each person submits to the risk of erroneous
punishment if the risk is reasonable may aid the enforcement
of justice. But why can't the innocent independent say that his
being exposed to a risk of punishment is a nonconsensual tax
upon him in order to bring about this public good? Any appeal
to social usefulness to compel him to submit to this tax would
stand at odds with the libertarian aspects of Lockean social
contract theory. After all, appeals to the social usefulness of
the state's monopoly on punishment were insufficient to create
a nonconsensual duty to enter into the state. 198
Furthermore, there will probably be great disagreement
concerning what procedures create an unreasonable risk of
erroneous punishment. If the probability of punishment is
increased, the number of natural rights violations (including
those in which one is a victim) will be reduced, but the number
of improper punishments (including those in which one is punished) will increase. It is very unlikely that natural rights
theory could settle the question of how much weight each of
these interests should get.199

LIC GoODS ARGUMENT 38 (1991).
196
It is unclear whether the guilty defendant has a right against being exposed
to unreliable procedures. See NOZICK, supra note 191, at 103. But because the

person applying the procedures will not know the defendant is guilty, the fact that
the guilty has no such right would not change everyone's duty to submit defendants to only reasonable risk imposition.
197
Nozick argues that those who submit others to reasonable risks have a duty
to compensate them if the risk materializes in harm. See NOZICK, supra note 191,
at 54-87.
198
One might argue, however, that a defendant who himself has exposed others
to a comparable risk of punishment when determining whether they had violated
natural rights has consented to this risk of punishment being imposed upon him.
Cf. George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,
548-50 (1972).
199
See NOZICK, supra note 191, at 97.
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A right of the innocent to struggle against the imposition
of any risk of punishment could ground a right of silence. If
the innocent has no duty to submit to the risk of punishment,
then he would have the right to reduce that risk, which could
include refusing to testify against himself or lying to investigators. This right not to be exposed to a risk of punishment is
one that would not be recognized by anyone investigating the
innocent independent's actions, however, since the investigator
would not know that the independent was innocent. For the
investigator to recognize such a right would mean he could
engage in no adjudication of guilt at all. But the investigator
would recognize that the independent who claimed he was
innocent would have a subjective privilege to remain silent.
Nozick himself suggests a similar argument for a right on
the part of the innocent not to submit to the burdens of adjudication, including testimony at trial.200 The innocent independent, Nozick argues, has no duty to benefit the overall administration of justice by participating in trial. Compelling his
participation is like taxing him to create a public good.
Although everyone might benefit ex ante from a policy of imposing this tax, including the innocent independent himself, this fact is insufficient to justify its imposition in the state
of nature.
Can the guilty independent complain about paying this
tax? Although Nozick is unclear on this issue, the argument is
undoubtedly that anyone who violates natural rights bears
responsibility for all costs reasonably necessary to effectuate
his punishment. The refusal to bear these costs would itself be
a rights violation that merits sanction. Thus the guilty would
appear to have no right of silence in the state of nature. The
Lockean would assume, as most critics of the privilege have

200

See id. at 102. ("If [the independent} chooses not to, he need not participate
in the process whereby the system determines his guilt or innocence. Since it has
not been established that he is guilty, he may not be aggressed against and forced
to participate. However, prudence might suggest to him that his chances of being
found innocent are increased if he cooperates in the offering of some defense."). It
is interesting to note that in the final sentence Nozick appears to assume that
adverse inferences from silence would be appropriate, even though they would
effectively compel participation in trial.
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noted, that wrongdoers have a duty to respond to questions
grounded in reasonable suspicion.201
The independent has one final argument for a right of
silence. If the adjudicator were investigating an illegality that
was not a malum in se, but rather one of those restrictions on
liberty to which only those who have willingly entered the
state may be subjected, then all independents, including the
factually "guilty," would have a right to refuse to participate
and to resist all imposition of a risk of punishment. The clearest example of this would be the prosecution of an independent
for refusal to pay income tax to the state.202
Thus, the independent would have a number of grounds
for refusing to testify if he was innocent (that is, if he did not
commit the crime charged or if he was charged with something
that was not a malum in se). First, he would have a right to
reduce his risk of conviction by refusing to provide self-incriminatory testimony and indeed by lying to investigators. Second,
he would have a right to resist the burden of testifying. Of
course, neither of these rights would be recognized by the adjudjcator. The adjudicator would, however, recognize that the
independent who asserted these rights would be subjectively privileged to act as he does, since the independent never
gave anyone the authority to determine whether he violated
natural rights.
4. The Rights and Duties of Criminal Defendants Within
Civil Society
The independent, on entering into civil society, would very
likely give up these rights to silence. As a result, the innocent
citizen would no longer have the right to struggle against the

201

See supra notes 20-22.
Cf. McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 832 F.2d 986, 987 (7th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (petition brought by taxpayer arguing absence of liability for income tax
on the ground of his withdrawal from his contractual relations with the United
States); Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1984) (imposition of
penalty for frivolous return challenged on ground that plaintiffs "are exempt from
federal taxation because they are 'natural individuals' who have not 'requested,
obtained or exercised any privilege from an agency of government"'); United States
v. Dretke, 707 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (defendant appealed
conviction for tax evasion on ground that he had not contracted with the United
States government for the provision of goods and services).
202
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risk of erroneous punishment, at least as long as the risk was
reasonable. Citizens would willingly put upon themselves a
duty to submit to a reasonable risk of erroneous punishment in
order to aid in the efficient enforcement of the criminal law.
For the same reason, they would also put upon themselves a
duty to aid the criminal justice system by testifying as defendants even if they were innocent, and to do so without compensation. Furthermore, knowing that they might not want to
testify, they would very likely give to the state a right to compel them to act in accordance with their duties. The ability of
the state to compel testimony would improve the accuracy of
its investigation into crimes and so contribute to the security
of al1.2oa
This duty to testify should extend beyond what the defendant takes to be natural rights violations. Locke emphasizes
that those who enter civil society can no longer set their judgment concerning what are rights violations against that of the
state.204 Furthermore, although regulatory laws substantially
restrict the liberty one had in the state of nature, Locke allows
that the state may restrict liberty in this fashion, provided
that public goods are created.205 If the regulatory law promotes the public good, then so should compelled self-incrimination concerning its violation. 206 Because those entering civil
society give up their rights to struggle against the state if they
are innocent, they would, it seems, not have even Hohfeldian

203

Like Hobbes, Locke argued that one would not give to the state authority
that would put one in a situation worse than the state of nature. One gives powers to the state "only with an intention . . • the better to preserve himself his
liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse)." LOCKE, supra note 1, § 131. But as we have
noted in our discussion of Hobbes, see supra Part IV.B.2., one's duties to the state
do not dissolve whenever they are to one's disadvantage. For it might have been
to one's advantage ex ante to create a duty that is subsequently to one's disadvantage. One example could be the duty to testify truthfully as a defendant. See A
John Simmons, Inalienable Rights and Locke's Treatises, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
175, 201-04 (1983).
204
See LOCKE, supra note 1, § 94 ("[No one can,] by his own authority, avoid
the force of the law when once made, nor by any pretense of superiority plead
exception, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his dependents.").
2011
See LoCKE, supra note 1, § 129.
2011
See A John Simmons, Locke and the Right to Punish, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
311, 328-29 (1991).
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privileges on the basis of which an expressive justification for
the privilege could be constructed.
Would the innocent defendant have a duty to submit to
punishment in civil society? It is one thing for the citizen to
accept a risk of erroneous punishment or the burdens of testifying at trial. It is quite another thing for him to give up to the
state his right to struggle against erroneous punishment itself.
Consider the case of Julius Krause, who was convicted of firstdegree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1940,
Krause escaped from prison and found the actual murderer,
who was later tried and convicted. Could Krause have been
permissibly punished for escape?207
If the spotty case law on the issue is any indication, he
could have been.208 Social contract theory suggests why this
might be right. Putting on citizens a duty to accept erroneous
punishment would appear to help law enforcement, by reducing the number of escape attempts by those who felt themselves to be innocent. Certainly the person entering civil society would accept the duty to submit to erroneous punishment
ifit amounts to a fine or a small amount of jail time, although
it is possible that he might reserve his right to struggle
against serious punishment, such as life imprisonment or
death, if he was innocent.209 In any event, individuals' reserving this right is insufficient to give the innocent defendant the
rights to reduce the risk of punishment during trial or torefuse to participate in the trial.

207

Krause returned to prison voluntarily. Incredibly, rather than being released,
as he had expected, he was kept in prison until 1951, when he was paroled. See
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 135 (1987).
208
Only if the conviction is wholly without law and so void does the escapee
have a defense. See People v. Ah Teung, 28 Pac. 577 (Cal. 1891); State v. Brown,
571 A.2d 1367 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). But see State ex rel. Robinson v.
Boles, 142 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1965) (denial of right to counsel during trial is defense of escape); MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.6(3) (1998).
209
The fact that the individuals entering the social contract reserved this right
will express itself in two ways. First, the state will not punish those who escape
from long jail terms or death row if the person is subsequently found to be factually innocent of the crime of which he was convicted. Second, the state will recognize that those who claim to be innocent and are sentenced to long jail terms or
death have a subjective privilege to struggle against the state (a privilege that
does not, of course, prohibit the state from keeping the convicted person behind
bars or putting him to death).
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5. Are Criminal Defendants in the State of Nature with
Respect to the State?
The only arguments the defendant might make for a
Hohfeldian privilege to be silent require him to escape the
authority of the state. Can he simply withdraw? Although
Locke argues that one who freely and explicitly consents to join
a political community cannot subsequently withdraw,210 it is
hard to see why one's consent could not be qualified by a right
of exit. Although they are not always well informed or even
consistent, the attitudes of radically libertarian groups can be
instructive here. Some members of the separatist Patriot
Movement, which explicitly relies upon a contractarian theory
of political obligation,211 believe that personal unilateral rescission of the social contract is possible, through the renunciation of the benefits of citizenship (for example, by revoking
their Social Security accounts, drivers licenses and automobile
registrations).212
Could any citizen assert a right of silence by withdrawing
from the state? Probably not, if asserting the right were contrary to duties created while one was a member. One who joins
civil society probably would put upon himself a duty to participate as a criminal defendant even after having withdrawn,
provided the prosecution concerns events occurring while he
was a member. Indeed it is hard to see how a promise to assist
in prosecutions against oneself or to submit to a reasonable
risk of erroneous punishment could be meaningful without its
applying even after one has withdrawn from the political community. Otherwise criminal defendants could escape the promise simply by exiting at the moment of indictment.213
The most promising argument may be the most direct.
Perhaps most of us never consented to join civil society to

210

See LocKE, supra note 1, § 121; see also LoCKE, supra note 1, § 243.
See Daniel Lessard Levin & Michael W. Mitchell, A Law Unto Themselves:
The Ideology of the Common Law Court Movement, 44 S.D. L. REV. 9, 22-27
(1999); Thompson Smith, Note, The Patriot Movement: Refreshing the Tree of Liberty with Fertilizer Bombs and the Blood of Martyrs, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 269, 301-02
211

(1997).
212

See Smith, supra note 211, at 302.
It is probably for this reason that Locke made the individual's promise to
join civil society irrevocable.
213
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begin with and so do not need to exit to assert rights of silence.
It is undoubtedly true that few of us have explicitly consented
to join any state.214 Even those who do appear to consent explicitly, such as those who undergo naturalization, often do not
have the choice about whether and where to emigrate and so
consent in circumstances that could be characterized as coercive.215 Even when one's choice to go to the naturalizing state
is discretionary, no one can choose to be a citizen of no state at
all. Therefore, no one can be said to make a free choice to take
on the general burdens of citizenship. Since we are compelled
to join some state, the idea of free consent to join a state is
empty. It is not surprising that members of the libertarian
common law court movement argue that the social contract
with the United States government constitutes a "contract of
adhesion," that is voidable at will.216
Because one cannot help but be a member of a state, the
Lockean argument that those who have benefited from the
protections of a state have implicitly accepted its restrictions is
also weak.217 For one had no choice but to receive these
benefits.218

214

This point has been repeatedly emphasized by critics of consent theories of
political obligation, see, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 239 (1979);
David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in HOME'S ETHICAL WRITINGS 255 (Alisdair
Macintyre ed. 1965), and by those who, although accepting consent theories, draw
anarchistic conclusions from them. See A John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 J. PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 274, 278 (1976).
215
See Rolf Sartorius, Political Authority and Political Obligation, 67 VA. L.
REv. 3, 12-13 (1981); A John Simmons, Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic
Government, 18 GA. L. REv. 791, 796-97 (1984). For a criticism of the view that
choices to join the state are made under duress, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent,
Coercion, and Hard Choice, 67 VA. L. REv. 79 (1981).
218
See Levin & Mitchell, supra note 211, at 23. Arguments that one has consented to join the state as a result of asserting one's voting rights are also weak.
We certainly cannot be said to have consented on the basis of our not having
voted to alter or dissolve our government. For we do not have the individual power to do so. Only majorities do. It is precisely this power of the majority to coerce
that was to be explained on the basis of individual consent. See SIMMONS, supra
note 159, at 218-24.
217
See LocKE, supra note 1, § 119. H.L.A Hart argued analogously that anyone
benefiting from others' restraint on their liberty may be similarly restrained. See
H.L.A Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REv. 175, 185 (1955); see
also RAWLS, supra note 112, § 18.
218
See NOZICK, supra note 191, at 90-95. One might argue that if someone
would have paid for the benefits had he been asked, then the mere fact that he
was not asked should not mean that he is under no obligation to pay for them.
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Never having entered into the social contract is one way of
escaping the authority of the state.219 But because it undermines the very possibility of the authority of the state, it is not
likely to be an argument that would be· recognized by the state.
Another argument is available, however. Locke also provides
citizens with the ability to put themselves back into the state
of nature by asserting a right of resistance against tyranny.
Furthermore, this argument is one that can be accepted by a
state that considers itself legitimate.

See SIMMONS, supra note 159, at 254-56. This seems particularly true if the benefits are public goods, such that keeping people from receiving them is impossible.
This argument from counter-factual consent appears to allow for a voluntarist
account of political obligation, because such obligation is still based on the psychological acceptance of the bound party. Compare Richard Arneson, The Principle of
Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92 ETHICS 616 (1982), which argues for a
nonvoluntarist obligation not to free ride on the cooperation of others. It therefore
still appears to be within the Lockean contractarian tradition.
But, as a practical matter, such an argument threatens to erase the distinction between natural and consensual duties to the state. Since an actual choice to
accept the benefits of citizenship is usually impossible (because the benefits cannot
but be provided), all that is ever practically required to establish a duty to the
state is the fact that the existence of the state is in one's interest. But this fact
was held to be insufficient to create a duty to the state for the Lockean. See supra Part IV.C.2. The ability to reject the state even if such rejection is to one's
disadvantage is essential to the Lockean voluntarist approach.
One might attempt to explain why someone would have accepted the state's
benefits had he been asked on the basis of more specific psychological characteristics that he possesses, rather than the mere fact that it is in his interest. But
such an approach would erect an insurmountable epistemic barrier to justifying
the state.
219
Accepting such an argument would not mean one had a license to bring
about anarchy. For if an illegitimate state is in general just in its actions, one's
natural duties may strongly limit what one may do in response to its illegitimacy.
As A. John Simmons, who is most often associated with this position, has stated:
Lockean anarchism . . . insists that persons in existing societies are by
no means free to do as they please, but rather that they have a wide
range of moral duties that will overlap considerably . . . their nonbinding
legal duties. And in most societies these moral duties overlap the most
central and important legal duties, prohibiting physical harming and most
serious disruption of others' lives.
SIMMONS, supra note 159, at 262-63. For example, a murderer would have no
right to struggle against an illegitimate state that punished him for murder.
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6. The Criminal Defendant and the Right to Resist the
State
Under the popular social contract, citizens give up· to the
majority their power to punish and retaliate against improper
punishment. As a result, the majority possesses the sole authority to determine and punish rights violations. This authority, by closing off one's subjective privilege to enter into conflict
with others, is intended to end feuding.
The majority's power to punish, plus the power to act with
discretion for the common good, is then delegated under the
rectoral social contract to a government. But there is a limit to
the authority that the political community gives to the government. If it acts arbitrarily or violates its trust, it may be legitimately opposed.220
But if citizens possess the right to resist an illegitimate
state, then they will have the subjective privilege to resist the
state when they perceiue that the state is illegitimate. Thus
even within the social contract there remains a subjective
privilege to enter into conflict. When there is conflict between
the people and its government over whether the government
has violated its trust, the government does not have the authority to determine who is correct. The people cannot give up
to the government their privilege to determine whether the
government's exercise of its power is justified or not. For giving
the government this authority would mean giving it the license
to be a tyrant. Although, as a practical matter, the government
may have the final word on the issue of whether it is a tyrant,
the people have the privilege to struggle against it.221 Be220

See LOCKE, supra note 1, §§ 202p204. This right of resistance against tyranp
nical government is a cornerstone of the American political tradition. See THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (asserting "right of the people
to alter or abolish" tyrannical government); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,
268 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Belief in the principle of revolution is deep in
our traditions."); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of
Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87 (1992) (discussing the natural law phip
losophers who influenced the Founders' belief that it is man's right and duty to
engage in self--defense against tyranny). This is not, however, a right to rebel
against the state. Locke understands rebellion to be a morally impermissible use
of force. See LoCKE, supra note 1, § 226; Simmons, supra note 203, at 189-90. If
the government has not violated its trust, the citizens have no right to resist it.
221
As Locke put it:
LT]hough the people cannot be judge . . . yet they have, by a law an~
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cause there is no ground for appeal in the conflict between the
people and the tyrant, the two stand in the state of nature
with respect to one another concerning the issue. Each has the
subjective privilege to act according to his own moral lights
concerning whether the trust has been violated.222
Furthermore the same points must apply to the
individual's right to resist an illegitimate state. The individual
does not give absolute authority to either his political community or its government. One enters into civil society "only with
an intention ... the better to preserve himself his liberty and
property." As a result, "the power of the society, or legislative
constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend further
than the common good."223 Because the rights the individual
gives over to the state are limited, he cannot but reserve the

cedent and paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate
determination to themselves, which belongs to all mankind, where there
lies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge whether they have just cause to
make their appeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with,
it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another as to give
him liberty to destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to
abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation; and, since he cannot
take his own .life, neither can he give another the power to take it.
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 168.
222
See LOCKE, supra note 1, § 91 ("[S]uch a man, however entitled-czar, or
Grand Signor, or how you please-is as much in the state of nature with all his
dominion as he is with the rest of mankind. For whenever any two men are who
have no standing rule and common judge to appeal to on earth for the determi·
nation of controvercies betwixt them, there they are still within the state of na.
ture •..."). Locke subsequently suggests that the people should be the judge on
the issue. See LOCKE, supra note 1, §§ 240-242. But this is not a claim about
political authority, as if the government has given to the people the right to de.
termine this issue (although such an agreement could be imagined). Indeed, he
inconsistently says in the same passage that the only real judge is God, and that
each man (including, presumably, the members of the government) must exercise
his judgment on this issue. See LOCKE, supra note 1, § 241. Of course, given that
the government's trust is to act for the common good, the fact that the political
community as a whole revolts against it is a fairly sure sign that the
government's trust has been violated.
Locke tends to speak in terms of the conflict between the political community
and a tyrant. But just as there is no authority to determine these issues with
respect to a tyrant, there is no authority with respect to a legitimate government
as welL Determining whether the government's trust has been exceeded is not
something that can be given over even to a legitimate government. Accordingly,
when the people rebel against the government unjustly-that is, when it has not
violated the rectoral social contract-they still put themselves into the state of
nature with respect to the government concerning that issue.
223
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 131.
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subjective privilege to exercise his judgment concerning whether these rights have been exceeded by the state.224 Because
the individual citizen has a right to resist an illegitimate state,
he has the subjective privilege to resist even the legitimate
state, provided that he perceives it to be illegitimate.225
Thus, when the individual challenges the state, for example, on the grounds that it has exceeded his consent or that he
never entered into a social contract in the first place, the individual and the state are thrown into the state of nature concerning that issue. Although the state will disagree about
whether it has legitimate authority over him and indeed will
struggle against him concerning the issue, it must recognize
that it does not have the authority to decide the issue that it
would have if the individual had a natural duty to the state.
But doesn't the existence of this subjective Hohfeldian
privilege to rebel mean that the social contract is illusory?
Can't one escape the social contract state simply by asserting
that it has been violated or that it never existed? Such worries
would appear to justify a Hobbesian approach, under which
security is established by giving to the sovereign an absolute
authority. In response to such worries, Locke argues:
Nor let anyone think [the right of resistance to tyranny] lays a perpetual foundation for disorder: for this operates not, till the inconvenience [from the tyranny] is so great that the majority feel it and
are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended. But this
the executive power, or wise princes, never need come in danger
of ....22s

The existence of an individual's privilege to resist the state
appears to leave individuals without any constraint only if one

224

See LoCKE, supra note 1, §§ 135, 168.
This claim is not dependent upon the existence of inalienable rights. For an
argument that Locke never believed in such rights, see Simmons, supra note 203.
The point is merely that if one does subject the authority one gives to the state
to conditions, then one must retain the subjective privilege to enter into conflict
with the state if one perceives that these conditions have been violated. This point
does not depend upon the idea that there are certain rights, for example, the
right of self-protection, that one cannot give over to the state. If there is any inalienable right at issue here, it is an inalienable right to make one's own judgments concerning the existence and extent of authority. See Arthur Kuflik, The Inalienability of Autonomy, 13 PHU,. & PuB. AFF. 271, 274-77 (1984) (outlining idea
of inalienability of one's own moral judgment and attributing this view to Locke).
226
LOCKE, supra note 1, § 168.
225
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ignores the influence that the perception of the rights and
duties in the social contract will have on individuals' actions.
Anarchy will result only if a large number of people perceive
the state to be illegitimate. And if the state is not illegitimate
this will generally be recognized by a majority of its citizens,
who will submit to its authority.
In other words, social contract theory does not explain how
one can end the state of nature-for the existence of disagreement without any adjudicative authority (except God) can exist
just as much after the social contract has come into existence
as before. All social contract theory does is explain the normative possibility of the state's authority. And it is the psychological fact that most people recognize this authority when it
exists that explains how the state of nature is avoided. What
creates civil society out of the state of nature is the stability brought about by people's perceptions of their duties to
the state.
Iri contrast, one who believes in citizens' natural duty to
the state will not accept that a citizen can put himself into the
state of nature simply by challenging the state's authority.
Because the state has authority over the citizen independent of
his consent, there is no condition upon the state's authority,
concerning which the individual can exercise his independent
judgment. As a result, there is no route by which the citizen
may legitimately enter into conflict with the state. Thus, although both the contractarian and the "natural" state will fight
against the rebellious citizen, the natural state will treat him
more like the radically evil or the child and deny him the respect accorded someone with whom one can engage in morally
permissible conflict. The only example of such morally possible
conflict for the natural state is warfare against another
sovereign state.
This is not to say that the criminal defendant receives no
benefits from being a member of the natural state. As in John
Griffiths' "Family Model" of criminal procedure,227 the natural state is also more likely to provide the rebellious citizen
with a level of concern that is denied combatants. The citizen's
privilege to rebel against the contractual state also provides

227

See supra Part IV. (discussing John Griffiths• "Family Model" of criminal

procedure).
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the state with the privilege to treat the criminal defendant as
an enemy to whom it owes no duty to reintegrate into society.
7. Does the Right of Silence Have an Expressive
Function?
We can now see how a state that took itself to have legitimate authority over a defendant could recognize that the defendant nevertheless had a subjective privilege to remain silent. A contractarian state would grant such a privilege to a
criminal defendant who both challenged its authority and
claimed to be innocent of any natural rights violation. But this
is not a direct justification for a right of silence. Even if
the state must recognize the defendant's subjective privilege to
struggle against it, the state retains its subjective privilege to
act according to its own moral lights and put upon the criminal
defendant the burdens of citizenship. To require the state to
give preference to the criminal defendant's views on the
matter would appear to involve a confusion between a privilege and a right against non-interference in one's assertion of
the privilege.
.
What then is the adversarial argument for the privilege? It
has its source, I believe, in the attempt on the part of the
contractarian state to distinguish itself from its natural counterpart. The manner in which the contractarian and the natural state may struggle against the rebellious defendant is
largely the same. Indeed, the contractarian state, like the
natural state, may call the defendant's resistance illegal. Since
the contractarian state may use the law in aid of its subjective
privilege, the fact that the defendant has a contrary subjective
privilege does not have direct legal consequences.228 It is
tempting, therefore, for the contractarian state to want to
express the fact that it recognizes the defendant's contrary
privilege to struggle against it by providing him with a legal
right that citizens of the natural state do not have, despite the
fact that providing him with this right might free him from
obligations that, by the contractarian state's moral lights,
the defendant willingly took on when entering into the state.

228

See supra Part IV.B.4.
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A right of silence, as well as other aspects of the adversarial
system, may play this expressive role.
This conception of the right of silence captures well the
tension in Damaska's account of the ideology of common-law
criminal adjudication. On the one hand, the state asserts moral authority over the defendant during the trial in innumerable
ways, for example, by detaining him, extracting nontestimonial
evidence from him, and, if he is convicted, by punishing and
seeking to rehabilitate him. On the other hand, in particular
areas of the trial the state cedes its authority over the defendant by allowing the defendant the liberty to express his competing interests in a neutral forum, as if the state had no authority over him and these competing interests were, by the
state's own lights, of equivalent moral worth.
Much academic discussion of whether one has a natural or
a contractual duty to one's political community has arisen in
the literature on the meaning and scope of the Second Amendment, which is often taken to be connected to the right to resist illegitimate government.229 Like the right of silence, an
individual right to bear arms may depend upon whether the
individual has merely contractual duties to the state. Those
who emphasize the civic republicanism of the Founders tend to
deny the existence of an individual right to bear arms. Although the civic republicans had a consent theory concerning
the rectoral social contract, allowing for a right on the part of
the political community as a whole to rebel against a tyrannical government, they did not believe that an individual's moral
obligation to his political community had its source in his consent.230 The political community instead played the essential

221

For this "insurrectionist" theory of the Second Amendment, see Colonel
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrection·
ary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 645-46, 653-56
(1995); Sanford Levison, The Embarassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637,
645·52 (1989); and Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the
Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 111-21 (1987). But see Dennis A
Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107
(1991).
230
See David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and the Second Amendment
Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 904-23 (1996)
(relying upon the allegedly civic republican views of the Founders to argue that
there is only a right of the People acting for the common good to revolt against
tyrannical government).
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moral role of providing the context within which an
individual's virtue could be fostered. As a result, they argue,
the individual cannot legitimately rebel against the state and
limits can be put on his ownership of arms as long as the possibility of rebellion by the political community as a whole
would not be reduced.231 The right to bear arms would be
possessed by a popular militia,232 but not by private militias,
such as the Freemen, who seek to withdraw from the political
community and assert their individual rights. 233
The notorious difficulty of determining the scope of the
right to bear arms and the right of silence may be a consequence of the fact that both rights exist in tension with the
state's natural and inescapable claim to legitimacy. Consider
what happens if the privilege to struggle against the state is
given full priority over the state's assertion of its legitimacy.
Private citizens should be able to maintain standing armies
and criminal defendants should have the right not merely to
refuse to speak but also to hide evidence, bribe witnesses,
escape detention, and lie on the stand. On the other hand, if
the state's assertion of legitimacy is given full priority, then it
is hard to see how there should be any individual right to bear
arms or right of silence, since these rights could be exercised
only against an illegitimate state.

231

See id.; David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia.: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J . 551, 586-96 (1991) [hereinafter Williams I}.
232
The right to bear arms would not, however, be possessed by a governmental
militia, such as the National Guard.
233
Williams claims that those who argue for a more individualistic right to bear
arms on the grounds of the Founders' belief in an individual's right to rebel inevitably redescribe individual rebellion in collectivist terms. In the end, it is always
the civic republican idea of a rebellion of the People, acting for the common good,
that is appealed to. See Williams, supra note 230, at 911-15. But he makes civic
republicanism appear more popular than it should by characterizing an individual's
right to rebel in Hobbesian terms as a right to aggress for self-interested purposes. See id. at 904-09. This ignores the extent to which natural rights and duties
limit one's actions in the state of nature. Once the individual right to rebel is
understood as limited by natural rights, it is harder to distinguish it from civic
republicanism. The fact that someone rejects naked aggression by private individuals against the state does not make him a civic republican.
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8. Earlier Arguments for the Privilege Reconsidered
The expressive theory of a right of silence has the potential to rehabilitate some of the rights-based justifications discussed in Part III. Consider the argument that a right of silence exists to protect the criminal defendant's right to make
autonomous moral judgments concerning his own culpability. 234 Although arguments from autonomy had a good deal of
persuasiveness, their Achilles' heel was the fact that they argued not merely against compelled self-incrimination, but
against the state's authority in general. But if the right of
silence is merely the legal expression of the criminal
defendant's subjective privilege to challenge the state's assertion of moral authority over him, then a state could recognize
the right of silence while continuing to exercise its authority.
In giving the defendant the right to refuse to testify, the .state
would not be giving up its authority over the defendant or its
power to punish and morally educate him. It would merely be
recognizing that the defendant can have a subjectively legitimate contrary view of the matter.
The same point can be made concerning the argument that
the right of silence is a protection against bad laws.235 This
argument, too, suffered from its anarchistic premises. If the
laws against which this right is asserted are indeed bad, then
why should they be enforced at all? On the other hand, if they
are good, then why allow the defendant to frustrate their enforcement? Here too an expressive account can make sense of
this apparent incoherence.
Indeed, the idea that the right of silence aids the truthseeking function of the trial can be rehabilitated to an extent.
From the perspective of the defendant, who seeks to reduce the
risk of what he believes is erroneous punishment, the right of
silence does contribute to the acquittal of the innocent.

234

2311

See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part ITI.B.

704

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: 3

D. The Trial as Anarchy and the Fox-Hunter's Justification for
the Privilege
The expressive argument for the right of silence is closely
related to what Jeremy Bentham derided as the "fox-hunter's"
justification.236 This justification sees the right as analogous
to the head start given to the fox in the interest of
sportmanship: "The fox is to have a fair chance for his life: he
must have . . . leave to run a certain length of way for the
express purpose of giving him a chance for escape." Bentham
rejected the fox-hunter's argument, because he could see no
reason why sportsmanship was a legimate value in the context
of criminal procedure.
But under the expressivist justification of the right of
silence, the contractarian state has a reason to cede control in
a trial. It does so in order to express the fact that the
defendant's resistance to the state, although wrong by the
state's own moral lights, is a form of morally legitimate conflict. To show that the struggle between the defendant and the
state is genuinely anarchic rather than the product of the
defendant's simple blindness to the state's natural authority,
the state withdraws in order to create an anarchic space within which the defendant can determine the contours of his conflict with the state. Analogously, the hunter gives the fox a free
run so that he will be able to decide how he wili respond to the
hunters-to introduce a fighting chance, a bit of anarchy, into
their interaction. The discomfort many feel with "inquisitorial"
systems is precisely the absence of anarchy. The agency of the
state is seen as pervasive.
This expressive right of the criminal defendant to determine just how he will struggle with the state has been noted in
other contexts outside of a right of silence. In Jones v.
Barnes,237 the Supreme Court ruled that appellate counsel's
refusal, on tactical grounds, to raise nonfrivolous issues insisted upon by the client did not amount to ineffective assistance
of counsel. 238 In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the
236

BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 238.
463 u.s. 745 (1983).
233
The Court in Jones emphasized the importance of "winnowing out weaker
arguments on appeal" and the tendency of a contrary ruling to "seriously undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client's case in accord with counsel's
237
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Court's ruling "denigrates the values of individual autonomy
and dignity central to . . . [the] Fifth and Sixth Amendment[s]."239 Brennan admitted that "[i]f all the Sixth Amendment protected was the State's interest in substantial justice,
it would not include [a client's right to control litigation strategy]. "240 But the Sixth Amendment recognizes the right of a
criminal defendant to use the trial for his own purposes and to
engage in a conflict with the state on his own terms. To use
the power of the state to enforce the rights of the lawyer
against the client would make the lawyer, and ultimately the
client, an agent of the state.241 Not surprisingly, Brennan
thought this right to personal confrontation with the state was
tied to the right against self-incrimination.242

E. Conclusion
To sum up, social contract theory cannot justify a right of
silence, since the most that it can do is provide the criminal
defendant with a subjective privilege to stuggle against the

professional evaluation." Id. at 751. Thus, one might draw the conclusion that
including the client's issues would have amounted to ineffective assistance of coun~
sel. But one might also see the Court as merely protecting defense counsel from a
court's second~guessing its judgments, whichever decision it makes. Nevertheless,
the underlying paternalism concerning the choice of legal tactics in the Court's
opinion certainly opens up the possibility that too much deference to the client
concerning tactics could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
This right of defense counsel to determine strategy follows from Rule 1.2 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Under Rule 1.2 the client has responsi~
bility for determining the objectives to be pursued. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1999) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation . . . ."). In contrast, the lawyer has
ultimate responsibility for determining the legal means of reaching those objec~
tives. Although Rule 1.2(a) states that a lawyer "shall consult with the client as to
the means by which they are to be pursued," id., the comment to Rule 1.2 speci~
fies that "the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical
issues." Id. cmt. [1).
239
Jones, 463 U.S. at 763.
240
Id. at 758.
2 1
• See id. at 764.
2
u According to such reasoning, the state should give great latitude to the competent criminal defendant who tries to further a self-destructive or perverse goal.
But if a criminal defendant is properly advised by counsel and insists on pursuing
a disadvantageous course of action, he should not be allowed to later claim ineffec~
tive assistance of counsel. The right to determine the nature of one's defense entails responsibility for one's decisions.
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state,~

privilege that coexists with the state's subjective privilege to put upon the defendant what it perceives to be the
duties of citizenship. But in the context of contractarianism a
right of silence can have an important expressive function. By
giving expression to the defendant's privilege to do battle, the
right of silence allows the contractarian state to distinguish
itself from a state that views its citizens as having natural
duties to submit to its authority. The question remains,
however, why the right of silence was fastened upon as a
means of expressing the criminal defendant's privilege to rebel.
Why not allow the defendant to struggle against the state in
another fashion, for example, by lying on the stand? With
this problem in mind, I turn now to the cruelty justification of
the right of silence.
V. THE RIGHT OF SILENCE AND THE MORALITY OF WARFARE

As we have seen, the cruel trilemma argument is, in the
end, reducible to an apparently unanalyzable intuition that it
is cruel to compel someone to bring about his own destruction-an intuition that has been claimed to be unintelligible by
some and obvious by others.243 But rather than relinquishing
all debate concerning this intuition,244 I believe it can be explained in terms of the morality of warfare. The fact that the
cruelty of self-incrimination is peculiar to conditions of battle
helps explain why the right of silence is thought to be an appropriate expression of the criminal defendant's anarchic
struggle with the state.
Consider the inhumanity of forcing a combatant to perform
actions, such as wearing the uniform of his opponent or saluting his opponent's flag, that make him look like an agent of his
enemies.245 Out of respect for these attitudes, we feel a duty
243

See supra Introduction Part B. (discussing the cruel trilemma argument).
See Dix, supra note 18, at 333 n.214 (intuition is "metaphysical"); Ellis,
supra note 6, at 838 (intuition is unanalyzable).
245
For this reason, under 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatme~t of
Prisoners of War, prisoners of war must be allowed to wear their uniforms and
insignia of rank, see 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 40; see also
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, art. 19
[hereinafter 1929 Geneva Convention}, reprinted in THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 277
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1981) [hereinafter ARMED CONFLICTS], and
244
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to allow adversaries to express their belligerence even as we
struggle to defeat them. We provide them with the minimal
right to behave as adversaries.
·
This right to belligerence finds expression in international
law, particularly in rules governing the treatment of prisoners
of war and civilians in occupied territories. Like criminal defendants, prisoners of war have a right of silence. Under the
1949 Geneva Convention as well as the 1929 Convention, these
combatants cannot be compelled to speak, and need only give
their name, rank, and serial number.246 Analogously, under
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, a belligerent was
"forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to
furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or
about its means of defense."247

cannot be required to salute enemy soldiers of lesser rank. See 1949 Geneva Con~
vention, supra note 27, art. 39; 1929 Geneva Convention, supra, art. 18. Anal~
gously, under the Hague Conventions, occupied populations could not be compelled
to swear allegience to the occupying power. See Convention (ID with Respect to
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, art. 45 [hereinafter 1899
Hague Convention], reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS, supra, at 83; Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 45 [herein~
after 1907 Hague Convention], reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS, supra, at 83.
1
" See 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 17. This right can be
traced earlier in the nineteenth century, see WilLIAM FLoRY, PRISONERS OF WAR:
A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93-94 & n.29 (1942), and
can be found in the first code of rules for land warfare ever adopted by a nation,
promulgated by President Lincoln and prepared by the great German-American
political theorist and scholar of mternational law, Francis Lieber. See General
Orders No. 100 of 1863, art. 80 ("Instructions for the Government of the Armies of
the United States in the Field") [hereinafter Lieber's Code], reprinted in ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 245, at 14. Lieber's Code had a direct impact on the Hague
Conventions, and through them, the Geneva Conventions. See Frank Freidel, General Orders 100 and Military Government, 32 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REv. 541, 54142, 555-56 (1946); Elihu Root, Francis Lieber, 7 AM. J. lNT'L L. 453, 466-69 (1913).
On the influence of Lieber's Code generally, see George B. Davis, Doctor Francis
Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field, 1 AM. J. lNT'L L.
13 (1907).
It is not surprising that international law governing the treatment of prisoners of war arose only in the nineteenth century. Prisoners were generally exchanged before that time, see A.J. BARKER, PRisONERS OF WAR 97 (1974), although
until the end of the middle ages they were generally enslaved or killed. See id.;
General J.V. Dillon, The Genesis of the 1949 Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 40, 40-41 (1950). Indeed the American Civil
War was the first conflict in which exchanges were not the predominant means of
dealing with prisoners of war. See Howard S. Levie, The Employment of Prisoners
of War, 57 AM. J. lNT'L L. 318 320 (1963).
1 7
1899 Hague Convention, art. 23(h), reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS, supra
'
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This right of silence is connected to a more general principle that captured adversaries cannot be forced to perform actions that directly aid their captors, for example, by working in
armament factories. 248 The 1899 Hague Convention read,
"Any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to take
part in military operations against its own country is prohibited."249 In addition, under both the 1899 and the 1907 Conventions, the labor of prisoners of war was to "have nothing to
do with the military operations."250 Under current internationallaw, similar restrictions apply. Because of the difficulty
in determining just what is directly connected with military
operation in the context of total warfare,251 the 1949 Geneva
Convention lists the work prisoners of war may be required to
perform, in an attempt to exclude work, such as handling munitions, that is more directly related to military operations.252
It could be argued that prohibiting prisoners of war from
working in munitions factories merely protects them from
labor that is dangerous. 253 If this were the sole concern sup-

note 245, at 77; 1907 Hague Convention, art. 44, reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra · note 245, at 82-83.
248
This right of prisoners goes back at least to the American Revolution, and,
although it was not in Lieber's Code, it was in place during the Civil War. See
FLoRY, supra note 246, at 84. The right, under customary international law, of
prisoners of war not to fabricate arms or ronstruct fortifications was generally
recognized in the nineteenth century. See FLORY, supra note 246, at 75 & n.29.
249
1899 Hague Convention, art. 44, reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note
245, at 83-84. The same requirement is in the unratified Brussels Conference of
1874, art. 26, reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 245, at 30.
250
1899 Hague Convention, art. 6, reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note
245, at 70; see also 1907 Hague Convention, art. 6, reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 245, at 70 (work "shall have no connection with the operations of the
war"). Under the 1929 Geneva Convention, work done by prisoners of war was to
"have no direct connection with the operations of war. In particular, it [was] forbidden to employ prisoners in the manufacture or transport of arms or munitions
of any kind, or on the transport of material destined for combatant units." 1929
Geneva Convention, art. 31, reprinted in ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 245, at
280.
251
See RICHARD I. MILLER, THE LAW OF WAR 44 (1975); Raymund T. Yingling
& Robert W. Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. lNT'L L. 393,
407 & n.48 (1952). For a discussion of the problems in determining what types of
work are directly related to military operations, see FLORY, supra note 246, at 7678; Levie, supra note 246, at 329-39; and Dillon, supra note 246, at 51-53.
252
See 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 50; see also The Leeb Case,
1948 ANN. DIG. 394; The Lewinsky Case, 1949 ANN. DIG. 515; The Student Case,
1946 ANN. DIG. 296.
253
Analogously, one could argue that the right of silence enjoyed by prisoners of
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porting this principle of international law, however, there
would be no reason to distinguish prohibited labor on the basis
of its relationship to the war effort. Indeed, compelling prisoners to engage in "labour which is of an unhealthy or dangerous
nature" is also prohibited in a separate provision of the 1949
Geneva Convention.254 International law prohibits work that
"is directly harmful to [the prisoner's] state of origin," not
merely work that is dangerous.255 The motivation for prohibiting such labor is to deny captors this opportunity to humiliate and demean enemy soldiers.256
These rights of prisoners of war can help to explain the
cruelty of compelling self-incrimination. Forcing a prisoner of
war to help kill his comrades and forcing the criminal defendant to help bring about his own punishment both involve a
type of psychological cruelty and humiliation that is tied to
one's identity as a combatant. The cruelty is linked to the fact
that the conflict is anarchic, in the sense that there is no overriding authority to settle the dispute and each side may act
according to its moral lights. This anarchic relationship largely
exists in international conflict and, as we have now seen, also
exists under contractarian theory when the criminal defendant
challenges the authority of the state. Because this justification
of the right of silence requires anarchic conflict, it would explain why the right is usually not recognized in personal relationships and, especially, not in the relationship between parents and children.257
war protects against torture alone, rather than against forms of symbolic humiliation, even though these are likely to accompany torture.
254
1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 52. The same was true of the
1929 Geneva Convention. See 1929 Geneva Convention, art. 32, reprinted in
ARMED CONFUCTS, supra note 245, at 280.
255
See FLoRY, supra note 246, at 74. Discussions of the provision make it clear
that it is the direct relationship between the labour and military operations that
is of concern, but they merely speak of the difficulty of drawing this line, rather
than spelling out why it is morally significant. See PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAw OF
WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 240 (1994) (1908); Levie, supra note 246, at 329-39.
Indeed, I could find no evidence of the ultimate motivations for the provision on
the basis of the "legislative history" of the provision or recommended amendments.
See WILLIAM I. HULL, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEm CONTRIBUTIONS
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 222-32 (1908); THE REPORT TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES
OF 1899 AND 1907 142-45, 522-28 (James Brown Scott ed., 1917).
2Ss The restriction is seen as having its source in "respect [for] the loyalties and
human dignity of the captured personnel." MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLoRENTINO P.
FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR 88 (1994).
251
See Friendly, supra note 4, at 680 ("No parent would teach such a doctrine
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The relationship between the right of silence and warfare
might also explain why the right does not apply in a civil suit.
Civil suits are a form of state-regulated dispute resolution
between those who have implicitly accepted the state's authority to adjudicate rights violations. The resolution of such conflict is within the context of civil society. Only when one refuses to accept the state's arbitration of a civil dispute, inspiring
criminal sanctions, can one express his rejection of the state's
authority in a form of anarchic conflict.258
A further analogy between the right of silence and the
rights of combatants is that both apply despite the fact that
one's opponent is considered morally wrong and one struggles
to defeat him. The insensitivity of these norms to the moral
status of one's adversary suggests that we are dealing with
role morality, that is, a form of moral reasoning that is incommensurable with normal moral rules. Role morality does violence to the idea that moral rules form a universal and consistent system. The rule that one should allow one's adversary to
express his belligerence exists in uneasy tension with the idea

to his children; the lesson parents preach is that while a misdeed, even a serious
one, will generally be forgiven, a failure to make a clean breast of it will not be.

Every hour of the day people are being asked to explain their conduct to parents,
employers and teachers. Those who are questioned consider themselves to be morally bound to respond, and the questioners believe it proper to take action if they
do not." (citations omitted)).
258
The morality of warfare might also explain why the right of silence does not
extend to those who receive immunity from prosecution. If the right of silence is a
right of warfare, it makes sense that genuine conflict with the state is a requirement for its exercise.
But the relationship between the right of silence and the morality of warfare
unfortunately provides little guidance concerning other problems with the scope of
the Fifth Amendment. Consider, for example, the question of non-testimonial evidence. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar not testimonial and therefore can be compelled); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)
(same for writing sample); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) {same for
blood sample). If one emphasizes that the right of silence exists to keep someone
from undermining his own side in battle, it would arguably require that it be
extended to evidence of a non-testimonial nature.
One might argue, however, that there are limits to a combatant's right not to
use his agency against himself. One can compel a soldier to throw down his weapons, for example. Requiring the defendant to turn over evidence or provide writing
samples or voice exemplars might appear more like such immediate acts of disarmament, insofar as they involve specific and well-defined actions that are short in
duration and that can usually be directly coerced. For that reason, one might
argue, they are less likely to make one appear as an agent of the enemy.
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that his cause is unjust and that he needs to be defeated and
morally reeducated. Normal morality would counsel one to act
so as to bring about as speedy a victory as possible. There
would be humanitarian restrictions on one's methods, but not
restrictions tailored solely to allow one's opponent to express
his belligerence.
·
It is precisely this discontinuity between the morality of
warfare and normal morality that explains why arguments in
favor of a right of silence have seemed so contrary to our normal attitudes toward responsibility and legitimate moral education. Why, if the defendant has committed a crime, is forcing
him to say so cruel? If we think he should be punished, why
should we allow him to frustrate this goal?259 This inconsistency is often considered an argument against the right. But
the hallmark of role morality is that it can recommend actions
that are inconsistent with one's general moral goals.260
m For a criticism of the idea of role-differentiated morality in favor of the
universality and coherence of moral obligations, see Richard W asserstrom, Roles
and Morality, in THE GoOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 28
(David Luban ed., 1983).
260
It is not surprising, therefore, that some have attempted to justify the adversary system in general, and the partisan duties of criminal defense attorneys in
particular, on the basis of role morality. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060,
1060-61 (1976) (arguing that role morality of friendship justifies partisan advocacy,
even though such a role is in tension with other moral relationships). For criticisms of Fried's thesis, see Edward A Dauer & Arthur A. Leff, Correspondence:
The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 578 (1977). For the early history of the
debate over role morality in legal ethics, see David Luban, Reason and Passion in
Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 876-80 (1999).
Of course, some of these have hoped to justify the role morality of lawyers in
a manner that makes it consistent with normal morality. For example, Stephen
Pepper bas argued that a lawyer's acting as a vigorous advocate for his client
enhances the client's autonomy. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyers Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs.
J. 613, 617; see also Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
717 (1987); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney·Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1987). But, as we have
seen, unless one is an anarchist, it is difficult to see how autonomy can justify the
intentional frustration of the enforcement of the law. See supra Part III.D. Others
have offered instrumentalist arguments that a partisan role for the lawyer contributes to the truth-seeking process. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's
Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1063 (1975); Lon L. Fuller & John D.
Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference of the ABA and
AALS, 44 AM. BAR Ass'N J. 1159 (1958) (arguing that adversarial system promotes
truth-seeking better than inquisitorial system, by inhibiting premature conclusions).
But these arguments suffer from problems similar to those encountered by the
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A relationship between the morality of warfare and the
right of silence can be seen in a number of contractarian arguments for the privilege. After claiming that the right qf silence
is derivable from the view that the state is "merely an instrument created by contract in which rulers and ruled [are] parties on equal terms," Fortas argues: "The principle that a man
is not obliged to furnish the state with ammunition to use
against him is basic to this conception. Equals, meeting in
battle, owe no such duty to one another, regardless of the obligations that they may be under prior to battle."261 Damaska
also ties the right of silence to the idea that "a party to a contest should not be compelled to become telum adversarii sui,
that is, an offensive weapon of his adversary."262
The morality of warfare helps support the contractarian
argument for a right of silence by focusing the expression of
the defendant's subjective privilege to struggle with the state
on a right traditionally given to those with whom we engage in
legitimate conflict. Indeed, the ideas that the right of silence is
the expression of an individual's privilege to challenge the authority of the state and that it protects him against a form of
personal humiliation are often expressed in the same breath.
An example is Justice Field's praise for the privilege in his
dissenting opinion in Brown v. Walker: 263
The reprobation of compulsory self-incrimination is an established
doctrine of our civilized society. As stated by appellant's counsel, it
is the 'result of the long struggle between the opposing forces of the
spirit of individual liberty, on the one hand, and the collective power
of the state, on the other.' As such, it should be condemned with
great earnestness . . . . A sense of personal degradation in being
compelled to incriminate one's self must create a feeling of abhorrence in the community at its attempted enforcement.264

instrumentalist argument for the right of silence. How can limiting access to evidence of guilt enhance the truth-seeking process? See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 25,
at 68-74; Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, 1031-38 (1975).
In fact, those who seek to 'justify" the role of the lawyer in this fashion are
not appealing to role morality at all. Since the resources for such justification are
the principles of normal morality, the role will not have the discontinuity with
normal morality that is its essence.
261
Fortas, supra note 24, at 98.
262
DAMASKA, supra note 126, at 126.
263
161 u.s. 591 (1896).
264
Id. at 637 (Field, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION: WHERE FROM HERE?

In this Article I have explained what I believe are the
dominant intuitions in favor of a right of silence among the
general population and ·have shown how they might provide
the source for a principled, if not airtight, argument for this
right. If I am correct, future discussions of the Fifth Amendment should deal with some unfamiliar issues in political
theory and moral psychology. How are these debates likely to
turn out?
Under my reading of the right of silence, its justification
depends in part upon whether we have only consensual duties
to submit to the authority of the state. For if criminal defendants may not legitimately challenge the authority of the state,
there is no reason to use the right to express the idea that the
defendant and the state are pursuing conflicting interests of
equivalent moral worth.
No one can deny that Lockean contractarianism was at
least a part of the ideology of the Founders. 265 But there is a
good deal of debate concerning whether civic republicanism,
which emphasizes natural duties to one's political community
and the role of this community in moral education, might have
been their predominant political philosophy. 266 Although earlier historical work suggested that Lockean contractarianism
was dominant,267 much work since the sixties has suggested
that civic republican views were of greater importance.268
2

t6 See, e.g., MORTON WmTE, THE PHILoSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5
(1978) (Locke's influence "goes without saying"); James A. Gardner, Consent, Legit-

imacy, and Elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty under the Lockean
Constitition, 52 U. PITI'. L. REV. 189, 192-200 (1990); Thomas G. West, The Classical Spirit of the Founding, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1, 4 (Jackson Barlow et al. eds., 1988).
2
" For a brief survey, see Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American
Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1999).
267
See, e.g., CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 27 (1958); LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIDERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 5-14 (1955). Cf. GoRDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 282-91 (1969) (although civic republicanism views were powerful at the time of the revolution, contractarianism came
to dominate by the time of the ratification of the Constitution).
214
See BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
33-40, 53-54 (1965); STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE,
LIDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3-38 (1990); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
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Since the right of silence as we know it arose after the
ratification of the Bill of Rights,269 however, it may be that
the Founders' political philosophy is less important than the
philosophy of those who were instrumental in establishing and
maintaining this right. Consent theories of political legitimacy
are commonly accepted among the general population in the
United States270 and have been for a long time. 271
But consent theories exist in tension with other attitudes
that people generally have. Indeed consent theories of political
obligation are difficult to reconcile with our view that people
currently living within the territorial confines of the United
States are actually citizens of the United States.272 Social
contract theory is also incompatible with commonly held views
in international law. It probably goes without saying that under international law an individual who challenges a state's
authority and seeks to separate from the state is not accorded
the rights of a combatant. Under the jus gentium (common
international law), rather than being an equal of the state, this
challenger was a pirate who was warring against nations as a
whole rather than against any particular nation. 273 The same
is true today. 274
In addition, the contractarian's view that those in the
state of nature may act upon their own perceptions concerning
rights violations, even when this will result in feuding, stands

(1975). For two recent attempts to reassert Locke's importance to the founding, while incorporating many of the insights of the civic
republicans, see DWORETZ, supra, at 37-38; and JEROME HUYLER, LoCKE IN AMERICA 1-28 (1995).
269
See supra Part I.
270
See Simmons, supra note 215, at 791 (consent theory is "widely and uncritically accepted today").
211
See generally Allen, supra note 266 (surveying contractarian arguments in
American case law in the past).
212
See supra Part IV.C.5.
213
See THEODORE DWIGHT WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 144 (1899).
27
' Under the definition of a combatant in the Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva
Convention (relating to protection of victims of international armed conflicts) a
combatant is a member of an organized armed force under command. See Protocol
I, art. 43, in ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 245, at 577. Indeed, even Protocol II,
governing domestic armed conflicts, which provides some limited protections (but
not a right of silence) for detainees, does not apply to those arrested as a result
of riots or isolated and sporadic acts. See Protocol II, art. 1, in ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 245, at 621.
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in stark contrast to our usual views concerning the reasonable
imposition of reciprocal risks. Submission to an authority
generally appears morally required when such submission
brings with it common benefits of coordination and the reduction of conflict.275
Furthermore, there is a strong tradition of treating one's
relationship with a political community as having a moralizing
effect on individuals. It is only in the context of making social
compromises with others that one realizes one's true nature.
The duty to cultivate virtue puts upon us a duty to enter into
civil society.
But even if it is true that one's duty to the state is merely
consensual, this is not enough to justify a right of silence.
There is no compelling reason that someone entering the social
contract would reserve such a right. The right of silence gets
support from contractarianism only because it provides a
means of giving legal expression to the criminal defendant's
ability to put himself into the state of nature by challenging
the state's authority. The right expresses that the state, although struggling against the defendant, recognizes his subjective privilege to struggle back. But one might ask whether
it is necessary to give legal expression to this moral fact at all
and, if it is necessary, why it must be done through a right
of silence.
Furthermore, even if the right is accepted as having expressive importance, it does so only for those criminal defendants who reject the state's authority and assert those natural
rights that would allow them to remain silent. One can easily
question whether a significant number of criminal defendants
actually challenge the authority of the state. Giving defendants
a right of silence appears to treat them as radical libertarians-Freemen, citizens of the Republic of Texas, members of
the Posse Comitatus or the Patriot or common law court move-

275

See SCHMIDTZ, supra note 195, at 38-40 (arguing that since one has a right

to punish only by the least risky acceptable method, those in the state of nature
have a duty to let the state punish for them); Leslie Green, Authority and Convention, 35 PHIL. Q. 329 (1985) (arguing for a limited moral duty to consider authority that provides the benefits of coordination). The duty to avoid conflict is the
reason why Kant thought that "each may impel the other by force to leave [the
state of nature]." IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS ).24 (Mary

Gregor trans. 1991) (1797).
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ments-who genuinely challenge the authority of the state,
sometimes in court.276 Furthermore, even if a criminal defendant did challenge the authority of the state, he must also
assert a colorable natural right to remain silent. Naked selfinterest on the part of the criminal defendant-the mere desire
to protect himself against punishment that he does not desire-would not make the criminal defendant's resistance subjectively privileged. Finally, there is the psychological question of whether those engaging in the necessary form of conflict
with the state feel genuine humiliation and subordination as a
result of their inability to express their belligerence through
silence. It may be that the principles of respectful combat that
bolster the right of silence are simply too musty and antiquated to be relevant to modern criminal defendants.
Contrary to academic consensus, the Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent is not without principled justification.
Indeed, these justifications are tied to profound issues in political theory and moral psychology. As a result, it is no wonder
that so many people find the right viscerally attractive. But
these justifications are also extremely subtle and conceptually
unstable. Spelled out in detail, they may lose their hold on the
popular imagination.

276
See United States v. Dretke, 707 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(defendant appealed conviction for tax evasion on ground that he had not contracted with the United States government for the provision of goods and services);
Hilgeford v. People's Bank, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 230, 233 (N.D. lll. 1986) (habeas
petitioner convicted of trespass asserted right of sovereignty, issued own orders as
judge in case, and held federal judge in contempt); cf. McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 832 F.2d 986, 987 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (petition brought by taxpayer
arguing absence of liability for income tax on the ground of his withdrawal from
his contractual relations with the United States); Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d
517, 519 (7th Cir. 1984) (imposition of penalty for frivolous return challenged on
ground that plaintiffs "are exempt from federal taxation because they are 'natural
individuals' who have not 'requested, obtained or exercised any privilege from an
agency of government'"). On the movements generally, see Levin & Mitchell, supra
note 211; Smith, supra note 211.

